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Contested Boundaries: Evaluating Institutional and Government Authority in 
Academia and Public Health 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores tensions between individual freedom and institutional 
authority.  Chapter one examines public perceptions of the legitimacy of “new frontier” public 
health measures.  I present results from a national survey of 1,817 adults concerning the 
acceptability of public health interventions for noncommunicable diseases.  We found that 
support for these interventions is high overall; strongly associated with race and political 
orientation; and tied to perceptions of democratic representation in policy making. There was 
much support for strategies that enable people to exercise healthful choices, but considerably less 
for more coercive measures.  These findings suggest that the least coercive path will be the 
smoothest.  Additionally, the findings underscore the need for policy makers to involve the 
public in decision making, understand the public’s values, and communicate how policy 
decisions reflect this understanding. 
  
Chapter two provides a normative analysis of the legitimacy of public health efforts to 
address noncommunicable disease.  I argue that we should move away from the harm principle 
as the basis for assessing the legitimacy of public health measures, and introduce John Rawls’s 
legitimacy principle as an alternative framework by which to assess the state’s moral authority to 
enact these new measures.  I suggest that the legitimacy principle better frames the relevant iv	
	
liberty interests at issue in questions of public health policy, and may offer a more robust 
protection for individual liberty than does the Millian harm principle. 
 
 
Chapter three examines institutional approaches to the oversight of faculty-industry 
consulting relationships within academic medical centers.  I report on a Delphi study to elicit 
medical school administrators’ views about the oversight of such relationships.  We found strong 
support for two oversight strategies: providing educational resources to faculty regarding 
consulting relationships with industry, and policies that would bring consulting agreements under 
institutional review.  Finally, respondents opposed the use of categorical prohibitions on 
consulting relationships with specific industries, recommending instead that agreements be 
evaluated based upon the specific activities of the relationship rather than upon the type of 
industry.  We conclude with specific recommendations for medical schools for the management 
of faculty-industry consulting relationships. 
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Introduction 
[The police power is] vested in the legislature by the constitution, to make, ordain and establish 
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws.., either with penalties or without...as they shall 
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. 
 
It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this power, than to mark its 
boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. 
--Chief Justice Shaw
1 
 
In May 2012, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg announced his plans for a far-
reaching ban on the sale of large sodas and other sugary drinks across the city.  Under the 
measure, food service establishments would be prevented from selling sugary drinks in 
containers larger than 16 ounces.  With this ambitious effort, New York City reinforced its status 
as an aggressive promoter of public health initiatives, a trend-setter whose public health 
initiatives have frequently become models for other cities, including calorie posting 
requirements, restrictions on trans fats, and bans on smoking in both indoor and outdoor public 
spaces.   
The rationale of the city’s proposal is perhaps best captured by the statement of Deputy 
Mayor Gibbs, who offered the following commentary in support of the proposed rule:  
Obesity is an illness that is slowly, painfully destroying health and 
taking lives.  Over time, our environment has been increasingly 
working against us.  People move less and eat more, portion sizes 
have grown, and sugary beverages—full of empty calories—have 
grown exponentially and nearly 6,000 New Yorkers are now dying 
each year of obesity related illness.  The question rightly became 
not: how dare the government intervene, but how dare the 
government fail to intervene? 
 
While the City’s approach found strong resonance among public health advocates, the 
support was far from universal.  To opponents, the measure represented yet another example of 2	
		
the nanny state run amok.  The ensuing debate revealed deep tensions over the balance of 
individualism, self-determination, and personal responsibility against countervailing themes of 
human interconnection and social obligation.   
This tension invokes broad themes at the heart of an ongoing debate within political 
discourse over the proper scope of criminal law and other forms of social coercion: What is the 
appropriate balance between individual autonomy and institutional control? What reasons might 
justify the control of personal behavior that, despite having impacts for others, is commonly 
viewed as self-regarding?  Who has the right to require individuals to modify their behavior, and 
under what circumstances? 
In this dissertation, I examine these questions, with a search for the appropriate balance 
between individual authority and institutional control.  Each of the three chapters in this 
dissertation addresses a normative or empirical question central to determining the appropriate 
balance between self-regulation and external control.  In Chapters 1 and 2, I explore the 
appropriate scope of government regulation in the name of promoting public health.  The central 
question motivating this research is that of legitimacy: how extensive is the moral authority of 
the government to protect and promote the health of the public?  In Chapter 3, I explore the 
balance between self-regulation and external control in the academic setting, with a focus on 
institutional oversight of faculty consulting agreements. 
The question of legitimacy can be examined through two different lenses.  The first is as 
a descriptive concept, referring to people’s beliefs about political authority.  In this approach, 
first set forth by Max Weber,
2 legitimacy is understood to be a function of the willingness of 
members of a society to assume the benefits and burdens associated with membership.  In the 
domain of public health, a public health activity is legitimate if the public perceives it to be an 3	
		
appropriate use of government authority, and therefore feel an obligation to comply with its 
demands.   
Descriptive legitimacy has important practical implications for public health agencies.  
Understanding the public's perceptions of legitimacy can inform critical policy decisions 
regarding both the target of interventions, as well as their scope.  This understanding can support 
efforts to obtain and maintain legitimacy of public health departments.  Obtaining and 
maintaining legitimacy is critically important because it affects both the public's willingness to 
support and comply with public health interventions; and the likelihood that public backlash will 
undermine their effectiveness.  The question of descriptive legitimacy, therefore, strikes at the 
heart of the ability of public health to effectively address non-communicable disease.  
The second lens through which to consider legitimacy is as a normative concept.  Under 
this view, legitimacy is related to the justification of authority.  Normative legitimacy concerns 
the proper extent and limit of the state's authority or legislative power. The inquiry of normative 
legitimacy is a search to define the acceptability of political institutions and their resultant use of 
political authority.  In a constitutional democratic society like the United States, the state itself is 
generally assumed to be legitimate.  The focus is therefore on the legitimacy of the state's use of 
coercive authority, or the types of public policies that the state may adopt.   
In Chapter 1, I explore the descriptive legitimacy of public health authority.  In joint 
work with Michelle Mello, I examine public perceptions of the legitimacy of “new frontier” 
public health measures, such as those targeted towards obesity, diabetes, and other 
noncommunicable diseases.  I present results from a national survey of 1,817 adults concerning 
the acceptability of these “new frontier” public health interventions.  We found that support for 
these interventions is high overall; strongly associated with race and political orientation; and 4	
		
tied to perceptions of democratic representation in policy making.  There was much support for 
strategies that enable people to exercise healthful choices—for example, menu labeling and 
improving access to nicotine patches—but considerably less for more coercive measures, such as 
insurance premium surcharges.  These findings suggest that the least coercive path will be the 
smoothest and that support for interventions may be widespread among different social groups.  
In addition, the findings underscore the need for policy makers to involve the public in decision 
making, understand the public’s values, and communicate how policy decisions reflect this 
understanding. 
In Chapter 2, I turn to the question of normative legitimacy, examining the legitimacy of 
public health efforts to address noncommunicable disease.  Within the field of public health 
ethics, the question of public health legitimacy has focused upon the Millian harm principle.  I 
challenge the appropriateness of the harm principle to determine the legitimacy of public health 
policies to address noncommunicable disease.  I argue that we should move away from the harm 
principle as the basis for assessing the legitimacy of public health measures, and introduce John 
Rawls’s legitimacy principle as an alternative framework by which to assess the state’s moral 
authority to enact these new measures.  I suggest that the legitimacy principle better frames the 
relevant liberty interests at issue in questions of public health policy, and may offer a more 
robust protection for individual liberty than does the harm principle. 
In Chapter 3, I extend this inquiry into the proper scope of authority to a new setting: 
academic institutions.  In this chapter, I examine the scope of institutional authority over faculty 
in medical schools and their affiliated institutions, with a focus on institutional approaches to the 
oversight of faculty consulting relationships within academic medical centers.   5	
		
While the ethical issues surrounding financial conflicts of interest have been well-
documented, far less attention has been paid to the legal aspects of consulting activities.  Of 
particular interest include the consulting agreements, or contracts, that govern faculty-industry 
interactions.  I report on a Delphi study (joint work with Steve Joffe, Eric Campbell, and 
Michelle Mello) of medical school administrators with expertise in the management of faculty 
consulting agreements.  Our primary purpose was to evaluate potential approaches for the 
oversight of such agreements so as to provide guidance for the management of faculty-industry 
consulting relationships by medical school faculty.  Through the Delphi process, we characterize 
shared norms regarding the acceptability of contract provisions, best practices for the 
management of consulting relationships, and the permissibility of faculty relationships with 
specific industries.  We found broad agreement among panelists regarding the importance of 
institutional review to protect the interests of medical schools and their broader institutions.  In 
examining specific strategies for oversight, we found strong support for two approaches: 
providing educational resources to faculty regarding consulting relationships with industry, and 
policies that would bring consulting agreements under institutional review.  While respondents 
supported a review mechanism for the evaluation of individual contracts, the panel was divided 
as to both the feasibility and desirability of mandatory as opposed to optional review.  Finally, 
respondents opposed the use of categorical prohibitions on consulting relationships with specific 
industries, recommending instead that agreements be evaluated based upon the specific activities 
of the relationship rather than upon the type of industry.  We conclude with specific 
recommendations for medical schools for the management of faculty-industry consulting 
relationships.
																																																								
1 Commonwealth v Alger, 61 Mass (7 Cush) 53, 85 (1851). 6	
		
																																																																																																																																																																																			
2 Weber M. Economy and society. Eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University 
of California Press; 1968. 
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CHAPTER 1  
	
Legal Strategies to Prevent Noncommunicable Disease: 
Public Views, and Why They Matter 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
The increasing burden of noncommunicable diseases is one of the greatest challenges 
currently facing American public health. Although infectious diseases continue to pose a threat 
to the nation’s health, their relative burden has been dwarfed by that of noncommunicable 
illnesses, particularly diseases associated with modifiable risk factors such as overeating, 
physical inactivity, and alcohol and tobacco use. Consequently, there is increasing interest in 
using law and policy to influence these behavioral risk factors. 
From a public health perspective, the mandate for population-level interventions is clear. 
In 2000 the three leading causes of death in the United States were tobacco use (contributing to 
18.1 percent of all deaths), poor diet and physical inactivity (16.6 percent of deaths), and alcohol 
consumption (3.5 percent of deaths).
3 The economic impact of health conditions related to these 
risk factors is also staggering.
4,5  
Many health departments and legislative bodies in the United States have adopted 
policies that apply both traditional and more innovative public health tools to combat tobacco 
use, obesity, heart disease, diabetes, and other chronic health conditions.
6,7,8 Examples include 
hemoglobin A1c surveillance programs to track the level of blood sugar control in people with 
diabetes, bans on the use of trans fat to reduce people’s intake of particularly harmful fats, 
increased taxation of cigarettes, and school-based body mass index screenings to identify obese 8	
		
and overweight children.  
These initiatives have provoked intense political and moral debates. The initiatives are 
part of the "new frontier" of public health law
9—historically, relatively few legal interventions 
have focused on behaviors to prevent noncommunicable diseases, and new initiatives venture 
into new and controversial terrain.  Critics assert that legal initiatives to combat obesity and other 
chronic health conditions unduly restrict individuals’ liberties and exceed the appropriate scope 
of governmental authority in public health.
10,11  
The controversy calls into question the public’s willingness to view as legitimate uses of 
the power of the state any new-frontier interventions that attempt to use the law to prevent 
noncommunicable disease by influencing personal health behaviors. Securing and maintaining 
moral and legal authority from the public for health officials to address a problem such as a 
noncommunicable disease and its behavioral underpinnings is critically important because that 
authority affects people’s willingness to support and comply with public policies.
12,13 
Compliance with such interventions, in turn, is a critical determinant of the extent to which the 
policies will achieve their objectives. 
Previous studies have not examined whether there is a relationship between legitimacy 
and compliance concerning public health laws. In other areas, although the evidence is somewhat 
mixed, studies have found legitimacy to be associated with an increased likelihood of 
compliance government regulations,
14 taxes,
15 and enlistment,
16 as well as an increased 
willingness to defer to legal authorities such as the police and courts.
17  
To date, public health agencies have moved through the contested territory of 
noncommunicable disease control without the benefit of a solid understanding of how the public 
views these initiatives. Prior research suggests that factors such as public trust and perceptions of 9	
		
government competence influence support for infectious disease control measures
18 and that 
educational attainment and sex predict a person’s support for some policies to address obesity.
19 
However, no studies have examined predictors of support for new-frontier public health 
initiatives across a range of noncommunicable health conditions.  
In this article, we present results from a national survey of US adults concerning the 
acceptability of public health legal interventions addressing noncommunicable diseases. We 
found that support for new-frontier public health interventions is high overall, strongly 
associated with race and political orientation, and tied to perceptions of democratic 
representation in public health policy making. Our findings can help lawmakers as they consider 
what level of support they can expect for new-frontier public health initiatives, why support may 
be forthcoming, and from whom.  
1.2  STUDY QUESTIONS  
We investigated four sets of questions. First, how do Americans perceive the 
performance of public health officials and agencies, both generally and in specific domains?  
Second, what are the public’s attitudes toward new-frontier public health initiatives, and 
how do these attitudes compare to perceptions of traditional public health activities? Because 
legitimacy could have various meanings, our survey asked respondents how much they would 
support or oppose various government initiatives. We examined levels of support for government 
action on seven noncommunicable health conditions and fourteen specific strategies to address 
them.  
Third, does support for new-frontier public health initiatives differ by demographic or 
health status characteristics? And fourth, how are attitudes toward these initiatives correlated 10	
		
with broader views about government, perceptions of the public health system, and opinions on 
personal responsibility for health?  
Our empirical approach was guided by a detailed conceptual model of legitimacy adapted 
from three models set forth in the political science literature. The first is based on citizens’ 
judgments about governmental trustworthiness.
14 This model examines the extent to which a 
government is motivated to deliver on its promises, do right for the people it serves, and seek 
policies that truly benefit the public, as well how capable it is of doing so.  
The second model, referred to as the procedural fairness model, assesses whether a 
government is structured to ensure that issues are resolved in a regular, predictable way, and that 
access to decisional arenas, such as legislative bodies or court systems, is open and fair.
20 The 
third model is based on “attitudinal consistency,” or the degree to which values expressed by a 
government are aligned with citizens’ own values.
21  
The literature on predictors of public support for public health interventions is 
surprisingly limited. Although influential normative scholarship has emphasized such features as 
public justification and transparency in decision making as indispensable conditions in 
maintaining public trust in various health contexts,
22, 23 empirical validation of these theoretical 
assertions is scarce. There is evidence that procedural justice and trust in institutions influence 
citizens’ evaluations of the police,
24 legal systems,
25 and scientific research,
26 but there are no 
published analyses of predictors of legitimacy in the public health context.  
Prior opinion surveys about the public health system have focused on Americans’ 
priorities in public health and the perceived performance of public health agencies.
27 The data 
shed light on the questions we are asking but fail to illuminate all of the drivers of legitimacy. In 
addition, many surveys have asked about support for specific public health initiatives, especially 11	
		
those aimed at obesity
28,29,30,31,32,33 and smoking.
34,35,36,37,38 However, surveys limited to a 
particular disease or risk factor are too narrowly focused to support an empirical analysis of 
legitimacy in new-frontier public health interventions generally. We report on predictors of 
legitimacy across a range of conceptual domains and intervention types. 
1.3  STUDY DATA AND METHODS 
1.3.1  Survey Questionnaire 
We designed a twenty-five-question survey instrument with structured response 
categories to elicit public views about the three domains of the conceptual model 
(trustworthiness, procedural fairness, and attitudinal consistency) and support for new-frontier 
public health laws.  
The survey questionnaire was developed in consultation with an advisory group of public 
health officials and experts, as well as psychometric experts at Knowledge Networks (now part 
of GfK), a professional survey organization. The draft questionnaire was initially piloted on 
forty-two adults, five of whom participated in cognitive debriefing interviews, and then pretested 
on another thirty adults.  
1.3.1.1  Survey Administration 
The final survey was administered online using KnowledgePanel, a standing, probability 
based, nationally representative sample of US adults maintained by Knowledge Networks. Panel 
members are recruited using random-digit dialing and address-based sampling, creating a 
sampling frame that covers approximately 97 percent of US households.  
To support subgroup analyses, we oversampled people with diabetes and residents of the 
New York City metropolitan area. We anticipated that New Yorkers would be especially familiar 
with new-frontier public health interventions given that city’s many initiatives in the area. 12	
		
The survey was fielded between October 12 and October 24, 2011. Knowledge Networks 
processed and weighted the data using a three-step weighting process to adjust for known 
selection deviations during sampling, noncoverage and nonresponse bias resulting from panel 
recruitment methods and attrition, and the oversampling of New York City residents and people 
with diabetes. Knowledge Networks merged the survey data with its previously collected data on 
panel members’ demographic characteristics, health status, and political attitudes and 
engagement.  
1.3.1.2  Data Analysis 
We divided the variables into two groups by combining responses of somewhat or 
strongly support and somewhat or strongly oppose. Then we used multivariate logistic regression 
to analyze predictors of support for government action in new-frontier public health areas and for 
specific public health legal interventions.  
A separate model was run for each of the outcome variables. Predictor variables—which 
were kept consistent across models to facilitate comparisons of effect sizes across models—were 
demographic characteristics, health status, perceptions of public health officials, political 
ideological orientation and engagement, and views on responsibility for health.  
Analyses were performed using the statistical analysis software Stata, version 11. 
Probability weights were supplied by Knowledge Networks. Missing data were rare (2.6 percent 
or less for any question). Collinearity checks were performed, and the final model included only 
moderate (rho < 0.57) correlations among the explanatory variables. 
We performed two sensitivity analyses. First, we eliminated one variable that had 
moderate correlations with other covariates and compared the results of the full and reduced-
form models. Second, we compared the results of models run with and without survey weights. 13	
		
The results were robust to these changes. 
1.3.1.3  Limitations 
Like all surveys, our study was subject to nonsampling error, including nonresponse bias. 
Notwithstanding the high response rate and weighting corrections for nonresponse, it is still 
possible that our sample was nonrepresentative in some way for which we could not adjust.  
Additionally, most survey respondents had not directly experienced most of the new-
frontier public health policies about which our questionnaire asked, and their reported levels of 
support may not reflect how they would actually respond to these initiatives. Furthermore, 
although we provided respondents with definitions of public health policies and officials, we did 
not assess their level of knowledge of public health agencies or activities, which may have 
influenced their responses.  
Finally, reported opposition to new-frontier public health initiatives may simply reflect a 
generalized suspicion of government. However, the fact that most respondents rated public 
health agencies’ and officials’ performance highly undercuts this hypothesis. Approval levels for 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention were particularly high, even though 
antigovernment sentiment tends to be directed at the national government. 
1.4  STUDY RESULTS 
1.4.1  Sample Characteristics 
Of 2,690 American adults invited to participate, 1,817 (67.5 percent) completed the 
survey. Table 1.1 summarizes the sociodemographic characteristics of respondents.  
Forty-four percent were current or former smokers and nearly 72 percent were overweight or 
obese. Because of deliberate oversampling, 22 percent had diabetes, and nearly 14 percent 14	
		
resided in the New York City metropolitan area. All results reported below represent national 
estimates derived through application of appropriate survey weights.  
  15	
		
Table 1.1: Sample Characteristics (N=1817) 
 Number  of 
respondents 
            %
† 
DEMOGRAPHICS     
Age (years)     
    18-35  387  21.3 
    35-64  1055  58.1 
    65 and over  375  20.6 
Education    
    High school or less  785  43.2 
    Some college  525  28.9 
    Bachelor's degree or 
      higher  507  27.2 
Race    
    White  1240  68.2 
    Black  199  11.0 
    Hispanic  254  14.0 
    All other races  124  6.8 
Sex    
    Male  916  50.4 
    Female  901  49.6 
Household income     
    1
st (lowest) quintile  262  14.4 
    2nd quintile  372  20.5 
    3
rd quintile  295  16.2 
    4
th quintile  415  22.8 
    5
th (highest) quintile   473  26.0 
Census region     
    New England  83  4.6 
    Mid-Atlantic   469  25.8 
      excluding NYC metro  152  8.4 
    East-North Central  216  11.9 
    West-North Central  95  5.2 
    South Atlantic  314  17.3 
    East-South Central  81  4.5 
    West-South Central  180  9.9 
    Mountain  124  6.8 
    Pacific  255  14.0 
Metro status     
   NYC metropolitan area  317  13.8 
   Metropolitan, not NYC  1249  68.7 
   Rural  251  13.8 
Household characteristics      
   Married  1003  55.2 
   Children living in   
     household  545  30.0 
Employment status     
    Employed  970 53.4 
    Disabled  177  9.7 
    Unemployed  670  36.9 
Health insurance coverage     
    Medicaid  78  4.3 
    Medicare  470   25.9 
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Table 1.1 (Continued) 
 
    Other   935   51.5 
    None  249   18.4 
HEALTH STATUS     
Overweight (BMI≥25) 1301  71.6 
Smoker   803  44.4 
Diabetic 401  22.1 
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS     
Political Ideology     
    Liberal  495  27.2 
    Moderate  663  36.5 
    Conservative  632  34.8 
Politically engaged  618  34.5 
 
 
† Source: Authors’ survey of 1817 American adults (unweighted data). Percentages may not sum to 100 due to 
rounding or refusals to answer. NYC=New York City.  “Unemployed” includes persons not working for any reason, 
including retirees, except those not working due to a disability. “Smoker” was defined as having smoked at least 100 
cigarettes in lifetime. “Politically engaged” was defined as reporting at least one of the following during the 
previous 12 months: held a publicly elected office; commented about politics on a message board or Internet site; 
written a letter to the editor; served on a community board; worked with others in the community to solve a 
problem; given money to a Presidential campaign; given money to another (non-Presidential) political campaign, 
issue, or cause; volunteered or worked for a Presidential campaign; volunteered or worked for another (non-
Presidential) political campaign, issue, or cause; contacted a government official; or attended a political protest or 
rally. 
 
1.4.2  Perceptions Of Public Health Agencies And Officials 
Survey respondents had a positive view of the performance of public health agencies, 
although the agencies were perceived to be more effective in some areas than others. Seventy-
five percent of respondents rated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s overall 
performance as excellent or good, and a majority also gave high ratings to state and local health 
officials (Table 1.2).  
Perceptions of the fairness and representativeness of public health officials’ decision 
making were more mixed. Only about one in three Americans perceived that public health 
officials “always” or “usually” make decisions in a fair way, respect people’s rights, and 
understand the public’s values. And roughly one in four had a much more negative perception, 
reporting that officials “rarely” or “never” demonstrated these characteristics.  17	
		
Although 75 percent of respondents gave high ratings to the performance of the 
government’s system of providing vaccines against infectious diseases, performance ratings were 
lower for other health threats, especially chronic diseases and obesity (Table 1.2). While 
perceived performance for these areas was low, the proportions of respondents who felt that the 
government had “a great deal” or “some” responsibility to address chronic diseases and obesity 
were much higher (69 percent and 61 percent; data not shown). These figures suggest that the 
performance ratings may reflect a view that the government has done too little, rather than too 
much, in those areas. 	
		 	
Table 1.2: Public Perceptions of Public Health Officials 
  %  
PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES & OFFICIALS:
a  Excellent  Good  Fair  Poor 
CDC 17.1  57.9  21.6  3.3 
State health department   7.4  53.2  33.0  6.4 
Public health officials in local community   7.2  47.8  36.7  8.3 
PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNMENT’S SYSTEM IN:
b  Excellent  Good  Fair  Poor 
Providing vaccines to prevent the spread of    
  infectious disease  22.7  52.7  19.3  5.3 
Detecting and preventing foodborne illness   7.5  43.7  34.4  14.4 
Preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS   6.7  43.1  38.0  12.2 
Reducing tobacco use   6.8  35.5  37.4  20.4 
Reducing obesity   5.1  29.7  43.2  22.1 
Preventing unintentional injuries   4.4  42.2  42.2  11.2 
Preventing chronic illnesses   4.1  33.7  45.6  16.5 
TRUST IN PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES & OFFICIALS
c   A lot  Somewhat  Not too much  None at all 
CDC 40.4  44.4  11.1  4.1 
State health department  22.0  55.6  17.3  5.2 
Public health officials in local community  18.7  54.8  19.9  6.6 
PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIALS:  Always  Usually  Sometimes  Rarely  Never 
Officials can be counted on to make decisions in a fair way   2.1  28.1  47.9  17.0  4.9 
Officials respect people's rights   4.2  34.3  41.0  15.1  5.4 
Officials understand the public's values   2.11  27.6  43.8  21.2  5.3 
 
Source: Authors’ survey of 1817 American adults (weighted data).  Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding 
a Question text: “How would you rate the performance of the following agencies or individuals?”  
b Question text: “How would you rate the performance of our government’s system in each of the following areas?” 
c Question text: “How much would you trust each of the following sources to provide accurate information about health problems or issues that are important to 
you?” 
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1.4.3  Perceived Legitimacy Of New-Frontier Public Health Initiatives 
1.4.3.1  Overall Levels Of Support 
Respondents were asked to rate the amount of responsibility that the government had to address 
various health challenges, representing both new-frontier and traditional areas for public health. 
With the exception of preventing unintentional injuries, a majority of respondents reported that 
the government had either “a great deal” or “some” responsibility to address each of the 
challenges.  
  However, higher proportions of respondents reported that government had “a great deal” 
of responsibility to address traditional public health challenges such as detecting and preventing 
foodborne illness, preventing HIV/AIDS, providing vaccines for infectious diseases, and 
preventing unintentional injuries, in contrast to meeting new-frontier health challenges such as 
preventing chronic illness, reducing tobacco use, and reducing obesity by encouraging healthy 
lifestyles.  
Although some respondents did not perceive a strong governmental responsibility to 
address new-frontier public health conditions, there were very high levels of support for 
government action in such areas. Strong majorities of respondents expressed support for 
government action in each of seven new-frontier areas, ranging from 70 percent for government 
action to reduce alcohol consumption to nearly 90 percent for government action to prevent 
cancer (Table 1.3). 
Acceptance of specific legal strategies was inversely related to the degree that they 
involve coercion or otherwise intrude into personal behavior. We examined support for four legal 
initiatives, selected to represent a range of coercive measures, in each of the following three 
areas: tobacco use, “obesity and related diseases like diabetes and heart disease,” and childhood 20	
	
obesity. In each case, support was highest for the least restrictive policy and decreased markedly 
as the burdensomeness and punitiveness of the policies increased (Table 1.3). 
To further explore the reasons why people oppose new-frontier public health policies, we 
asked respondents to rate their support for two legal initiatives. The first was a hemoglobin A1c 
surveillance scheme modeled after New York City’s program to track blood level control in 
people with diabetes. The second was a legal mandate that all food manufacturers and chain 
restaurants substantially reduce the amount of sodium in their products.  
Two-thirds of respondents supported the surveillance scheme and three-quarters 
supported the sodium reduction requirement. Among those who opposed the policies, in both 
cases, fewer than 10 percent cited skepticism of their effectiveness as the primary reason. Nearly 
80 percent of those opposed to the surveillance scheme grounded their opposition in a perception 
that “the policy would intrude too much into individual privacy,” and nearly 77 percent of those 
opposed to the sodium reduction mandate felt that “government should stay out of matters like 
what people eat.” 21	
		 	 	
Table 1.3 Support for New-Frontier Public Health Initiatives 
 
% Who 
Support 
% Who 
Oppose 
HOW MUCH DO YOU SUPPORT OR OPPOSE GOVERNMENT ACTION TO:     
Prevent cancer  88.9 11.2 
Prevent heart disease  85.6 14.4 
Help people control their diabetes  83.7 16.3 
Prevent childhood obesity  81.3 18.7 
Prevent and reduce tobacco use  75.9 24.1 
Prevent obesity in adults  75.8  24.2 
Reduce alcohol consumption  70.2 29.8 
SUPPORT FOR POLICIES TO REDUCE OBESITY AND RELATED DISEASES
a 
Increase affordability of fruits and vegetables  83.6 16.4 
Require postings of calorie counts  80.8 19.2 
Prevent use of food stamps for soda and other sugary beverages  75.7 24.3 
$50 annual surcharge on insurance premiums of obese individuals  37.6 62.4 
SUPPORT FOR POLICIES TO REDUCE CHILDHOOD OBESITY
b
   
Require more instruction in public schools about the health risks of obesity 
89.2 10.8 
Require public school students to participate in at least 45 minutes of daily physical 
activity   88.4  11.6 
Require BMI screening and surveillance of schoolchildren  52.0 48.0 
Make possession of soda and other junk foods a disciplinary offense  32.5 67.5 
SUPPORT FOR POLICIES TO REDUCE TOBACCO USE
c
   
Provide people with free nicotine patches  72.6  27.4 
Require cigarette packages to display graphic images  63.4  36.6 
Make it illegal to smoke in private spaces  37.9  62.2 
Permit employers to test and fire for tobacco use  20.0  80.0 
SUPPORT FOR:     
Requiring food manufacturers and chain restaurants to significantly reduce sodium 
content of their foods  75.9  24.1 
Hemoglobin A1C surveillance program  65.7  34.4 
 
Source: authors’ survey of 1817 American adults. Response categories combine somewhat and strongly 
support/oppose. 
a Question text: “Thinking about government policies to reduce obesity and related diseases like diabetes and heart 
disease, how much would you support the following policies…” 
bQuestion text: “Thinking about government policies specifically aimed to reduce childhood obesity, how much 
would you support the following policies…” 
cQuestion text: “Thinking about government policies specifically designed to reduce tobacco use, how much would 
you support the following policies…” 
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1.4.3.2  Differences Across Population Subgroups:  
Multivariate analyses revealed significant differences in support for government action in 
new-frontier public health areas across population subgroups, with African Americans, women, 
and people ages eighteen to thirty-five reporting higher levels of support for government action 
than whites, men, and older Americans (Table 1.4). 
The difference across races was especially large and consistently significant for all seven 
new-frontier public health areas. The odds of supporting new-frontier initiatives were two to four 
times higher for African Americans than for whites, depending on the health condition 
addressed. Hispanics were also significantly more supportive than whites of government action 
in two areas, prevention of heart disease and control of diabetes.  
  The association of race and other demographic characteristics with support for specific 
new-frontier public health interventions was less consistent. African Americans, women, people 
with lower incomes and levels of educational attainment, and those ages eighteen to thirty-five 
were significantly more likely than others to support some of the initiatives tested, but the 
significance of these effects varied across initiatives (Table 1.5). Banning smoking in private 
spaces was significantly associated with a greater number of demographic characteristics than 
other initiatives were. 
  We hypothesized that New York City residents would be more likely than other 
respondents to support new-frontier public health initiatives because they were particularly 
familiar with them. However, such an effect was generally not in evidence (Tables 1.4 and 1.5).  
We anticipated that people who were overweight, smoked, or had diabetes would 
disproportionately oppose new-frontier public health initiatives because, as targets of such 
interventions, they might perceive the policies to be especially burdensome. Such an effect was 23	
		 	 	
present for smokers (Table 1.5). However, people with diabetes were significantly more likely 
than others to support government action in new-frontier public health areas and no less likely to 
support specific policies (Table 1.4). Being overweight predicted lower support only for 
insurance premium surcharges on obese subscribers (Table 1.5).  		 	 	 	
Table 1.4 Regression Results: Support for Government Action in New-Frontier Areas  
  Odds Ratios 
 
Prevent 
Cancer 
Prevent Heart 
Disease 
Help People 
Control Diabetes 
Prevent 
Childhood 
Obesity 
Prevent 
Tobacco Use 
Prevent 
Adult 
Obesity 
Reduce Alcohol 
Consumption 
SOCIODEMOGRAPHICS               
  Age 18-35   1.8**           1.2           2.0***   1.5    1.5*     1.6**  1.1 
  African American        3.9**    2.8**           4.3***       3.3**      2.1**      2.4**                2.7*** 
  Hispanic        1.7    2.2**           2.8***   1.4    1.3          1.3  1.5 
  Other race        0.5**           0.9     1.2   1.0   0.8          1.1  1.5 
  Male        1.0           0.9     1.3   0.9         0.6***  0.8                0.5*** 
  1
st (lowest) income quintile        1.7           1.2     1.6   1.1   1.0  1.4                1.8** 
  2
nd income quintile        1.1           1.1     1.5   1.1   1.1          1.2                1.9*** 
  New York City resident    3.0***           1.3     1.1   1.5   1.0  1.6  0.8 
HEALTH STATUS             
  Smoker        1.1           1.1     0.9   0.9   0.8          0.9               0.7** 
  Diabetic    2.2***    1.6**         1.7**   1.4     1.4*     1.5**               1.9*** 
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS             
  Liberal        1.5           1.0     1.0   1.5     1.5*    1.6**  0.9 
  Conservative        0.5***      0.5***           0.6***         0.5***    0.8      0.5***  0.8 
  Politically engaged        1.2           0.9     1.1   0.8    0.9  0.7*  0.8 
BELIEFS             
Positive rating of government performance 
in addressing public health conditions        1.1           1.0     1.0    1.0*    1.0  1.0  1.0 
Positive rating of performance of public 
health agencies        0.7    0.7**       0.7*   0.7    0.9  0.9  1.0 
Trusts public health agencies        1.4           1.5*         1.7**    1.5*    1.2    1.4*  1.1 
“People like me” can influence government 
priorities in public health        2.4***      2.0***            2.2***        1.9***          1.7***      1.5**                1.7*** 
Personal understanding of officials’ 
decisions about public health policy        1.9**    1.8**     1.2   0.9      1.5*   1.2                1.9*** 
Public health officials make decisions in a 
fair way        0.9           1.2     1.5         2.2***     1.2   1.3  1.1 
Public health officials respect people's 
rights        1.7*           1.4     1.4     1.8**          1.9***   1.4  1.0 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Public health officials understand the 
public's values        1.4            0.9             1.5          2.7***             1.1        1.9***             1.5* 
Internal health locus of control        1.1***            1.1***             1.1***          1.1***             1.0        1.1***  1.0 
 
† Source: Authors’ survey of 1817 American adults. Logistic regression models predict the probability of strongly or somewhat supporting government action to 
address each health condition.  The following respondent characteristics were included in all models, but did not achieve statistical significance in any model: 
educational attainment, marital status, presence of children in the household, employment status, disability, urbanicity, being overweight (BMI>25), being elderly 
(>64 years), household income in the 3
rd or 4
th quintile, and Census division. “Internal health locus of control” was defined as the degree to which an individual 
believes that health outcomes are a direct result of internal factors, such as one’s own behavior, as measured by the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control 
scale. *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0. 
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Table 1.5 Regression Results: Support for Specific New-Frontier Policies 
  Odds Ratios 
 
Require Food 
Manufacturers and 
Chain Restaurants 
to Reduce Sodium 
In Foods 
Hemoglobin A1c 
Surveillance 
$50 Annual 
Insurance 
Surcharge for 
Obese Persons 
School-based Body 
Mass Index 
Screening 
Banning Smoking 
in Private Spaces 
Graphic Labeling 
on Cigarette 
Packages 
SOCIODEMOGRAPHICS             
Age  18-35    1.1  1.7*** 1.7*** 1.2  1.9*** 1.4* 
Age  65  and  over  1.5*  0.9 1.2 1.0 1.7***  1.4* 
Some  college    0.9 0.7**  1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 
Bachelor’s degree or higher  0.8 0.6***  1.2 1.1 1.1 0.7** 
African  American  2.3**  1.3 0.8 1.1 2.1***  1.5 
Hispanic  1.2 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.8***  0.9 
Other  race  1.4 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.7**  1.1 
Male  0.6***  1.1 1.1 1.4**  0.8*  0.9 
1
st (lowest) income quintile  1.1  2.3*** 1.0  2.0*** 1.9**  1.4 
2
nd income quintile  1.3  1.5*  1.0  1.4  1.8***  1.2 
3
rd  income  quintile  1.3 1.0 0.9 1.5*  1.0 0.8 
Unemployed  0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7** 
West North Central region  0.7 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.9* 
Married  1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5**  1.0 
Child  in  household  1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.5***  1.4** 
HEALTH STATUS             
Overweight (BMI>25)  1.1 1.1 0.6***  0.9 1.0 1.2 
Smoker  0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7***  0.4***  0.7*** 
Diabetic  1.4 0.7*  0.7 1.2 1.6**  1.1 
POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS             
Liberal  0.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.2 
Conservative  0.5*** 0.7*** 0.8  0.6*** 0.7*  0.7** 
Politically  engaged  0.7 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 
BELIEFS              
Positive rating of government 
performance in addressing public 
health  conditions  1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
2
6
		
Table 1.5 (Continued) 
Positive rating of performance of public 
health agencies      0.7*     1.0    0.9  1.0   1.1   1.0 
Trusts public health agencies     1.1     1.1    0.8  1.0       0.7**   1.1 
“People like me” can influence 
government priorities in public health     1.2     1.2    1.2     1.4**       1.4**       1.4** 
Personal understanding of officials’ 
decisions about public health policy     1.2     1.1     1.4*  1.3    1.2         1.6*** 
Public health officials make decisions in 
a fair way     1.1     1.0    0.9  1.0    0.8                0.8 
Public health officials respect people's 
rights     0.9     0.9    1.0  0.9    1.1                1.0 
Public health officials understand the 
public's values           2.7***          1.9***     1.4*     1.5**     1.5*     1.4* 
Internal health locus of control       1.0*          1.1***         1.1***       1.1***     1.0*    1.0* 
  
† Source: Authors’ survey of 1817 American adults. Logistic regression models predict the probability of strongly or somewhat supporting each policy.  The 
following respondent characteristics were included in all models, but did not achieve statistical significance in any model: disability; urbanicity; New York City 
metropolitan residency; residence in other Census regions; and household income in the 4
th income quintile. *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 
2
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1.4.3.3  Beliefs About Government And Health:  
As expected, support for most new-frontier public health initiatives was significantly 
lower among political conservatives and respondents who believed health status to be strongly 
controllable through individual action (Tables 1.4 and 1.5). Results concerning beliefs about 
public health officials were more complex.  
The belief that “people like me” can influence which public health problems the 
government chooses to prioritize was a strong and consistent predictor of support for government 
action and specific initiatives, with odds ratios of 1.5 to 2.4 (Table 1.4). Respondents were also 
significantly more likely to support new-frontier public health initiatives if they perceived that 
public health officials understood the public’s values (Table 1.5). However, perceptions of public 
health officials’ and agencies’ performance, trust in public health officials, perceptions that they 
could be counted on to make decisions in a fair way, and perceptions that they respected people’s 
rights were generally not significant predictors of support. 
1.5  POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
As public health agencies seek to combat the increasing burden of chronic disease, they 
confront critical questions about how to set priorities and evaluate the wisdom of policy 
approaches. These decisions require careful weighing of the following considerations: the 
importance of the problem, the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of various interventions, and 
the likelihood that the chosen interventions will enjoy public acceptance.  
Public opinion should not be the sole determinant of public health policy agendas or 
policies.
39 However, if policy makers do not understand that opinion, policy choices may go 
seriously awry. When members of the public view a policy as legitimate, they may be more 29	
		 	 	
likely to comply with the behavioral changes that public health officials are seeking to 
encourage, which strengthens the policy’s chances for success.  
Public backlash against some new-frontier public health interventions suggests that 
legitimacy is a major challenge facing public health officials working in this realm. Identifying 
predictors of public support and ways to maximize that support thus provides key building 
blocks for informing sound policy decision making. Our findings suggest several lessons for 
public health policy makers considering new-frontier public health interventions.  
1.5.1  The Least Coercive Path Is The Smoothest 
One key finding is that the greater the restraint a legal intervention imposes on individual 
liberty, the greater public opposition to the intervention is likely to be. There was much support 
among our respondents for strategies that enable people to exercise healthful choices—for 
example, menu labeling and improving access to nicotine patches—but little support for more 
coercive measures, such as insurance premium surcharges.  
Respondents who opposed particular policies identified their effects on liberty and 
privacy as the primary reason for that opposition far more frequently than concerns about the 
policies’ effectiveness. These findings suggest that continuing the current focus on using law to 
shape health environments, rather than exerting more direct pressure on individual behavior, is a 
sound strategy for maximizing the legitimacy of policies. 
1.5.2  Support May Come From Surprising Quarters 
Policy makers generally need not fear strong opposition from groups that feel “targeted” 
by a particular new-frontier public health intervention because of a health condition.  Contrary to 
our expectations, except for the most punitive policies we examined, survey respondents were no 
less likely to support interventions aimed at obesity and diabetes if they had those health 30	
		 	 	
conditions than if they did not. This is consistent with political science research findings that 
self-interest has minimal explanatory power in explaining the attitudes of the American public.  
Smokers, however, were less likely than other respondents to support policies to 
discourage tobacco use. This result suggests that self-interest may play out differently where an 
intervention targets a health behavior, rather than a health condition.  
Our data also suggest that unlike self-interest, concern for one’s social group may 
influence attitudes toward public health interventions. We found higher levels of support for 
government action in new-frontier public health areas among African Americans and, to a lesser 
degree, Hispanics. A possible explanation is that the diseases targeted by such interventions 
disproportionately affect minority communities.  
1.5.3  Pay Attention To The Public Health Policy-Making Process 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, policy makers should understand that people’s 
beliefs about the public health policy-making process drive their perceptions of the legitimacy of 
new-frontier public health interventions. The strongest predictor among the belief measures we 
tested was the perception that “people like me” can influence government priorities in public 
health. Also important was the belief that public health officials understand the public’s values. 
These constructs were strong and consistent predictors of perceived legitimacy across multiple 
public health policies. 
These measures relate to the notion of democratic representation in public health policy 
making. Interestingly, this construct appears to play a larger role in driving public support for 
new-frontier public health interventions than the trustworthiness of public health officials, their 
record on respecting individual rights, or their performance generally.  31	
		 	 	
Thus, of the theoretical models of legitimacy that we discussed above and tested, the 
procedural-fairness model appears to have the greatest applicability in the public health realm. 
This model emphasizes reliable processes of resolving issues and open, fair access to decisional 
arenas. Our data suggest that the public’s conception of fairness may have less to do with how 
particular decisions are made than with more general considerations of access to the decision-
making process and faith that decision makers know their constituents well enough to carry out 
their will.  
1.6  CONCLUSION 
How, then, can policy makers maximize support for new-frontier public health 
interventions? First, they should involve the public in priority-setting activities in public health. 
Second, they should seek to understand the values held by different segments of the population 
and incorporate those values into policy decisions. Third and finally, they should communicate 
to the public how they incorporated those values into policy decisions. Public justification for 
important policy decisions should be offered in every instance and should reflect an 
understanding of and respect for the public’s values. 
Public health officials are currently working within a challenging political climate that 
includes a strong movement toward smaller government. In this context, the high level of public 
support that we found for government action to address new-frontier health problems is striking. 
Public health officials should be heartened by this finding. In moving forward, the challenge is to 
respond to this demand for a public health response to noncommunicable disease in ways that 
allow members of the public to feel that their voices are heard, understood, and valued. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Mill, Rawls, and the Search for a Principle of Public Health Legitimacy 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
What are the limits of government authority to protect and promote the health of the 
public, and how should we understand these limits in an era increasingly characterized by non-
communicable disease?   
A scan of any major news outlet today reveals this inquiry is far from academic. Public 
health proposals across the nation foster rigorous debate across the media and wider 
blogosphere: can a city restrict soda size to reduce obesity rates? Can bans on smoking in public 
places be extended to cover parks and beaches? Can companies be permitted to require 
employees to participate in wellness screening programs? 
These proposals pose a central challenge for public health regulation: to what degree can 
the state restrict individual freedom in the name of reducing the burden of conditions such as 
diabetes, obesity, or hypertension, which, as noncommunicable diseases, pose no direct risk of 
physical harm to others? 
  Such questions obviously require empirical assessments, for the issue of the effectiveness 
of interventions has a central role in evaluating the appropriateness of a regulation. The question 
of effective interventions for the conditions at issue here is one that deserves attention, 
particularly given the complex disease etiology of the chronic diseases targeted by these form of 
interventions.  However, underlying these questions of effectiveness is a deeper inquiry—even if 
such policies are effective at achieving the stated health goals, is such state intervention ethically 
permissible?   36	
	
The fundamental question here is therefore one of legitimacy: how extensive is the moral 
authority of the government to protect and promote the health of the public?  Does this authority 
extend so broadly so as to include the capacity to address noncommunicable disease prevention 
through the regulation of individual health behaviors?   
In a liberal society, this question of the legitimacy of state action in the name of public 
health is one that involves a balance between the government’s power to secure the communal 
provision of security and welfare against the constraint of preserving the liberty of its citizens.  
In the United States, this constraint is commonly understood as deriving from the Constitution, 
which creates a zone of non-interference for individuals, independent from government 
constraints on individual decision-making.  What is less clear, however, is how extensive this 
zone of non-interference is to be understood: what forms of regulation are prohibited, of what 
forms of activities, and how strictly? 
To date, much of the contemporary discourse has revolved around the “harm principle” 
of John Stuart Mill, arguably the most familiar proposal for a principled limit to state authority.  
In this chapter, I will argue that the harm principle, despite its intuitive appeal, fails to adequately 
frame the liberty interests at issue in public health policies and thus fails to provide adequate 
protection of liberties.  This deficiency results from the harm principle’s exclusive focus on the 
legitimacy of the reasons given for a law. I argue that we should consider not only the rationale 
given for a public health policy, but also the effects of that policy on individual liberty.  I then 
suggest that the liberal principle of legitimacy of John Rawls offers an alternative means by 
which to determine the principled limits of public health authority, one that may have some 
advantages over the traditional Millian approach. 
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2.2  PUBLIC HEALTH LEGITIMACY IN AN ERA OF NONCOMMUNICABLE 
DISEASE 
The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic shift in the nature of disease challenges in the 
United States, as morbidity and mortality from noncommunicable disease that are associated 
with modifiable risk factors replaced infectious diseases as the leading threats to the nation’s 
health.
40  While the burden of infectious diseases, including tuberculosis, influenza, and HIV, 
continue to pose considerable challenges to population health, their overall impact on total 
morbidity and mortality has been dwarfed in recent decades by the burden posed by chronic 
diseases, particularly those associated with lifestyle behaviors such as overeating, physical 
inactivity, and tobacco use.  By 2010, the 3 leading causes of death in the U.S. were poor diet 
(contributing to 25.5% of all deaths.), tobacco use (17.8% of deaths), and high body mass index 
(14% of deaths), with physical inactivity and alcohol consumption contributing an additional 
8.8% and 3.3%, respectively.
41  
  This changing pattern of disease, or “epidemiologic transition,”
42 has been accompanied 
by a series of new public health interventions aimed at addressing the challenges posed by non-
communicable disease at the local, state, and federal level.  These interventions aim to extend the 
familiar tools of public health, such as surveillance of disease and regulation of harmful 
substances—long used to combat infectious diseases and occupational exposures—towards 
addressing such modern health challenges as diabetes, obesity, and heart disease. 
This shift in public health interventions is perhaps most evident in New York City’s 
public health approach over the past decade.  In 2002, the City’s Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) launched a series of initiatives targeting chronic disease, including 
tax increases on tobacco products; comprehensive smoking bans in restaurants, parks, and other 
public places; a ban on the use of trans fats by food service establishments; and mandated 38	
	
posting of calorie counts on menu boards in chain restaurants.
43  In 2006, the City expanded its 
efforts to include diabetes management, enacting regulations which mandated laboratories to 
report hemoglobin A1C levels to DOHMH, thereby creating the nation’s first community-wide 
diabetes registry—and in so doing, launching the nation’s first surveillance program that tracks a 
disease which is neither communicable nor associated with environmental or occupational 
exposure.
44  Most recently, the City’s Board of Health moved to ban the sale of sugar-sweetened 
beverages over 16 ounces at all restaurants, movie theatres, sports stadiums, and food carts.
45 
While New York City has become perhaps the most visible and aggressive leader in these 
efforts, it has not been alone in its approach.  Similar efforts have developed across the nation at 
both the local and state level, including mandatory body mass index screening and surveillance 
for schoolchildren,
46 taxes on soft drinks and obesogenic foods,
47 and bans on smoking in private 
spaces such as cars and homes.
48  While public health continues to be a primarily local and state 
issue, the federal government has increasingly exerted its authority in this arena.  Recent 
examples of federal public health laws include those established by the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, which authorized new public health regulations such as excise 
taxes on indoor tanning services
49 and mandatory nutritional labeling at chain restaurants and 
vending machines.
50 
   These new interventions vary in the degree to which they rely on coercion or otherwise 
limit individual freedoms in order to achieve their objectives.  Some initiatives involve little to 
no restrictions on individual freedom, such as those that aim to provide information or to shape 
choices by changing the “default option.”
51  Other initiatives, however, deliberately limit 
individual choice in order to reduce the prevalence of unhealthy behaviors such as smoking, poor 
diet, or physical inactivity.
52  Such limits on choice have provoked intense controversy, 39	
	
particularly for those measures perceived as relying upon a greater degree of coercion to achieve 
their stated health goals.   
The objections to the use of coercive state authority to control non-communicable disease 
have taken several forms.  Across the media and blogosphere, pundits have repeatedly invoked 
the image of the "nanny state" to denigrate proposals they view as posing an undue intrusion into 
autonomy, substituting government control over matters for which individuals should be 
permitted to make decisions for themselves.  Vociferous critiques have also been launched 
within academic circles, particularly among legal scholars.  Among the most vehement scholarly 
critiques has been offered by Richard Epstein, a conservative legal scholar, who argues that 
newer public health regulations unduly extend public health authority beyond its purported 
“traditional” role of combating health threats that involve collective-action problems (such as the 
threat of infectious disease) into “inappropriate areas” of health regulation.
53 According to this 
view, public health authority should track the idea of public goods (or bads) in economics: public 
health action is legitimate only to address communicable disease and other collective action 
problems where competitive markets cannot be relied upon to secure the social optimum, such as 
sanitary water and sewer systems, pollution, and securing a safe food supply.
54  As obesity and 
related disease pose “no imminent threat to the public,” they do not merit the same level of 
intervention as infectious diseases.   
  Epstein’s construction of a sharp delineation between “old” and “new” public health has 
been criticized at various levels, including for presenting a historical portrayal that oversimplifies 
the trajectory of American public health,
55 and veiling his political and moral preferences behind 
seemingly objective claims about the economics of disease control.
56  While I’m sympathetic to 
these critiques, I suggest Epstein’s criticisms nevertheless merit a serious consideration of the 40	
	
appropriate boundaries of public health law, as they invoke themes that reflect a broader 
discomfort with how these newer public health measures fit within a liberal society.  
This broader discomfort has been previously described by Lindsey Wiley as representing 
an emerging critique of the new public health that is liberal "in the classical sense."
57 This 
critique reflects a general discomfort with the expansion of government power to protect public 
health as a potential incursion on the values of liberalism, which,   
by definition, holds liberty to be accorded priority over other goods and demands that limitations 
on liberty be carefully, narrowly, and thoroughly justified.  
This liberal critique has been explored in considerable detail by The Nuffield Council, an 
independent body in the United Kingdom that examines and reports on ethical issues in biology 
and medicine.  As described by in the Council's report, Public Health: Ethical Issues,
58 liberals 
emphasize autonomy, valuing the individual's ability to determine the course of his or her own 
life.  Liberals also place emphasis on equality between citizens in both the personal and political 
spheres of life.  Finally, while the liberal agrees with the libertarian thesis on the need to 
constrain the state's authority so as to protect individual freedoms, the liberal also believes that 
the state's power may be used to advance the welfare of its citizens.  The inherent tension for 
public health in the liberal state is therefore how to both protect autonomy while promoting 
welfare. 
In its report, the Nuffield Council identifies the harm principle of John Stuart Mill as one 
way to resolve the tension between these two values.  The choice of this principle reinforces a 
long-standing trend in public health ethics. As observed by Powers, Faden, and Saghai,
59 
numerous contributions to the public health literature, both in the United States
60,61 and in other 
Western nations,
58,62 have put the harm principle “front and center” in the debate over the proper 41	
	
scope of government authority in public health, particularly with respect to addressing 
noncommunicable disease.   
On its face, Mill’s harm principle presents a robust defense of individual liberty.  one that 
finds strong resonance in a liberal state.  By restricting the scope of state authority to cases 
involving harm to others, Mill's principle seems to offer the protection against the "mission 
creep" the liberal critique of the new public health presents as so objectionable.  However, a 
closer read of the principle suggests that it may not protect liberty to the extent desired by its 
proponents.  Of even deeper concern to liberals, the harm principle may, rather than preserving 
individual autonomy, actually serve as the rationale for inappropriate encroachments on 
individual liberty. 
In Section 2.3, I will offer several observations as to why Mill’s harm principle is ill-
suited to address questions of public health policy in a liberal state.  My argument proceeds as 
follows.  First, I argue that Mill’s focus on the reasons for a law as the test of legitimacy is 
problematic because it makes legitimacy dependent upon assessing the legislative intent of a law, 
which leads us down the proverbial rabbit hole regarding the coherence of legislative intent. 
Second, I argue that the focus on paternalism fails to adequately frame the liberty interests 
invoked by public health policies, which aim not at the benefit of individuals but rather at that of 
populations.  Finally, I argue that exclusive focus on the rationale for the law fails to give 
adequate consideration to the effects of law on individuals, which thereby fails to give adequate 
priority to liberty. 
Given these limitations, I propose that we consider whether an alternative framework 
might be better suited to the question of legitimacy in public health practice.  In Section 2.4, I 
begin the exploration for such an alternative by looking to a theory that has had tremendous 42	
	
influence both within the broader field of political theory, and more narrowly within the field of 
ethics and health.  Specifically, I suggest that the work of John Rawls and his liberal principle of 
legitimacy provides an alternative, and arguably more illuminating, lens through which to 
examine questions of public health authority. 
 
2.3  RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE IN PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
In the introductory section, I suggested that the harm principle of John Stuart Mill is ill-
suited to determine when public health authority is—and is not—appropriate.  This limitation 
occurs, I argue, for three distinct but interdependent reasons: the reliance on the problematic 
concept of legislative intent; the failure to adequately characterize the true liberty interests at 
issue; and its failure to give adequate priority to liberty resulting from the exclusion of 
considerations of the effects of a law on individual liberty. 
In the remainder of this section, I will introduce Mill's harm principle and explore the 
challenges encountered in its application to concrete policy questions, with a focus on the 
implications of these challenges for public health practice.  Ultimately, I suggest that these 
limitations should motivate us to broaden our search for other liberal frameworks that might 
better inform the question of when public health authority is legitimate. 
  
2.3.1  Introducing Mill’s Harm Principle 
In the opening of On Liberty, Mill describes his subject as “social liberty,” or the nature 
and limits of power that society can legitimately exercise over an individual.  Alan Wertheimer 
explains this issue as resulting from the need to adjudicate two competing values.
63 First, 
following Kant, we believe the individual is the primary locus of moral value and thus are 43	
	
committed to the priority of individual freedom.  Yet we also believe that the state is justified in 
exercising coercive power over the individual—if it does so for the right reasons.  The debate, 
however, is what these reasons are, or, as Mill describes, how it is that we are to make the 
“fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control.”
64   
Mill (boldly) asserts that this adjustment can be made using one “very simple principle” 
to determine when the state can legitimately restrict individual liberty.  The central thesis of 
Mill’s argument can be summarized by the following passage, referred to (though not by Mill 
himself), as the “harm principle.”  According to Mill: 
… the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so 
would be wise or even right.  There are good reasons for 
remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, 
or entreating him, but not for compelling him. The only part of the 
conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which 
concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own 
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
65 
 
Thus, if an individual’s action harms others, the state has an appropriate reason 
to restrict his or her liberty.  This claim seems fairly uncontroversial.  Yet Mill goes 
further, and claims not only that this test provides a reason to justify state interference 
with liberty, but that it provides the only reason.
66  According to Mill, determining the 
proper limits of state action is a straightforward test: if the action harms others, the state 
can restrict an individual’s liberty.  If the action harms only the individual, the state 
should not interfere.  44	
	
Two features are worth noting with respect to Mill's argument.  First, Mill 
constructs the test of legitimacy as dependent upon the reasons for state interference.  
The harm principle acts to distinguish classes of reasons that are permissible grounds 
for state restrictions of individual liberty from impermissible classes of reasons.
67  The 
second feature is the types of reasons that Mill finds permissible.  Specifically, state 
action is only permissible when undertaken for the purpose of preventing harm to 
others. 
Both of these features, I argue, raise issues for the use of Mill's harm principle 
as a test of the legitimacy of government action in public health.  In the remainder of 
this section, I will identify several of the most challenging problems facing Mill’s harm 
principle as a test of the legitimacy of public health measures.  For most of the issues 
discussed below, I will admittedly be rehearsing complaints made by previous critics of 
Mill's project.  My aim in presenting these issues here is not to introduce a novel 
critique of Mill, but instead to suggest that these limitations point us to the need for an 
alternative framework, one which I will introduce in Section 2.4.   
 
2.3.2  Liberty, Legitimacy, and Legislative Purpose 
Mill's argument for the harm principle rests upon a fundamental presumption in favor of 
individual liberty.  As presented by Mill, determining whether a law is legitimate therefore 
becomes a search for the types of reasons that can justify state interference with that liberty.   
In framing the test in this way, Mill's harm principle becomes a test of legislative intent.
68  
This framing raises (at least) two issues.  First, it requires identifying the reasons motivating a 
legislature with respect to the public health proposal in question--in other words, what is to be 45	
	
understood as the legislature's intent.   However, whether any coherent notion of legislative 
intent can be reliably determined—or even exists—is far from a settled matter.   
The central critique of legislative intent can be summarized as follows: as the legislature 
is not a person, but rather consists of a group of people with diverse goals and interests, it is not 
the form of subject to which we can attribute an intent.  As argued trenchantly by Max Radin in 
his 1930 Harvard Law Review article,  
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection 
with words some two or three men drafted, which a considerable 
number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving 
majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, 
different ideas and beliefs.
69 
 
Radin's skepticism about legislative intent raises an obvious challenge for Mill's proposal: 
if legislative intent does not exist (or at least, cannot reasonably be identified), how then are we 
to evaluate whether or not the intent is a permissible reason for state action? 
One possible response to this concern is that, while legislative intent perhaps cannot be 
divined from the legislature as whole, it is nevertheless often possible to reduce the intention to 
some subset of the legislators, such as the intention shared by the majority who vote in favor of a 
law.
70  Yet even among the majority of legislators who vote a bill into law, there may be a large 
number of motivating reasons, such that no single one can be said to serve as the motivating 
reason for a law's passage.  
An alternative response might be that, even if unable to restrict the motivations of various 
legislators to a single reason, we may nevertheless be able to identify a family of reasons held by 
legislators as justification for the law.  While this is likely more consistent with the actual 
process of lawmaking as described by Radin, it is unclear that this removes the challenge for the 
harm principle, as the principle gives little guidance regarding the evaluation of laws that are 46	
	
supported by multiple types of reasons.  For example, to take an issue of particular relevance to 
the examination of contemporary public health policies, how are we to consider cases where the 
aim of improving an individual's own good is only one of several rationales offered in support of 
a law? Does the presence of any paternalistic justification count to make the law impermissible? 
Conversely, can the objection of paternalism be diffused if we are able to identify a non-
paternalistic reason? 
These issues are central to determinations of public health legitimacy, as public health 
laws are often supported by multiple reasons, including protection of the individual directly 
regulated by the law, protection of other individuals from indirect harm, as well as protection of 
the public from diffuse harm.
71  Consequently, public health laws often take the form of what 
Joel Feinberg describes as “mixed paternalistic laws,”
71 or laws that are supported by a mixed 
rationale, one that is only partly paternalistic. 
  What guidance does the harm principle provide for evaluating such cases?  James Wilson 
suggests two potential interpretations, neither of which seems plausible.
72  At one extreme, we 
could read the harm principle as holding that the presence of any paternalistic reason is sufficient 
to overrule other reasons, thereby rendering the law illegitimate.  Yet this seems implausible, as 
it would allow the rationale of a single legislator to render an otherwise permissible law as 
illegitimate.  At the other extreme, we might hold that any non-paternalistic reason would be 
sufficient to make a law permissible.  This seems similarly implausible, resulting in almost no 
policy being ruled impermissible on grounds of paternalism as there is likely always to be at least 
one possible non-paternalistic justification for a policy, even one which has a large paternalistic 
bent.  47	
	
An alternative approach, suggested (and subsequently rejected) by Wilson, is that we 
might aim for a rule that would hold that “a policy is (impermissibly) paternalistic if most of the 
motivation behind it is paternalistic.”
72  However, this returns us to the previously unresolved 
issue of having to determine the legislative intent of the policy, reinforcing the issues associated 
with making legitimacy dependent upon the intent or reasons motivating a policy.   
 
2.3.3  Legislative Purpose, Public Health, and Paternalism 
A second issue arising from making legitimacy in public health dependent upon the 
reasons for government policy is that it presupposes a theory of government regulation that is 
inconsistent with the actual practice of public health policy.  As discussed previously, Mill 
proscribes government action that is done for the sake of preventing self-regarding harms.  The 
challenge, however, is that public health policy, unlike clinical medicine, aims not to improve the 
health of a single patient, but rather that of the population.  Public health policy, therefore, 
focuses not on restricting individual actions so as to protect defined individuals from harm, but 
rather aims more broadly, focusing on reducing the prevalence of risk factors at the 
environmental level.
60,73   When we institute water treatment programs, we don’t say “we do this 
to protect you, Citizen X, from making the reckless decision to drink contaminated water” but 
rather “we treat the water to reduce the risk of water-borne diseases.”  Similarly, when a food 
manufacturer adopts a voluntary program to reduce the sodium content in its foods to reduce 
heart disease risk, while we may know that this will lead to fewer lives lost to heart attack or 
stroke, we will not be able to identify which specific individuals we will protect.  The effort 
therefore aims not to protect defined individuals from the harm they might incur from eating too 
much salt, but rather to reduce the overall distribution of risk across the population.  While such 48	
	
policies unquestionably impact choices at the individual level, they are not motivated by a 
straightforward presupposition that any particular individual may otherwise not act in his or her 
best interest, but instead by an effort to manage population-level risks.  
Given this orientation, the thrust of Mill's objection against paternalism seems misplaced.  
What is potentially objectionable about public health policies is not that they supplant an 
individual’s judgments about what is best for his or her own interest, but instead that they do so 
based upon what is best for the interest of the population at large.  
If this is true, the harm principle’s orientation towards concerns of paternalism fails to 
appropriately characterize the true liberty interests that deserve consideration and protection in 
public health decision-making.  The risk to liberty is not, as the Millian paradigm would suggest, 
from government regulation that acts to know what is best for any citizen more than he himself 
knows, but instead from regulation that puts the interest of population-level health over the 
citizen’s interest in determining for himself which health risks to assume. 
  This mischaracterization has practical implications.  Failing to adequately identify what 
liberty interests are at issue makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that those interests are 
given adequate protection.  Recognizing the true limitations on liberty therefore facilitates 
conceptual clarification of the relevant issues, enabling us to identify and weigh the trade-offs 
involved in decisions over how--or even whether--to regulate.  The more relevant question is 
therefore not whether or not an individual’s health poses a risk of harm to others, but instead on 
when, and in what circumstances we, as a society, may—and may not—do to reduce health risks 
at the population level, with the recognition that such actions may restrict the range of individual 
action.   
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2.3.4  Exclusive Focus on the Rationale Obscures Relevant Considerations of the Law’s 
Effects  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by focusing exclusively on the law's rationale, the 
harm principle obscures consideration of what should be a central concern for liberals, namely, 
the effects of those laws on individual liberty.  While the harm principle restricts the use of 
coercive state authority to the cases where the aim is to prevent harm to others, it places no 
principled limits on the use of law once the threshold of harm to others has been reached.  As 
described by Dripps, "[t]he harm principle operates catastrophically; conduct is either harmless 
and therefore immune from punishment or harmful and thus fair game."
74   
Under this framing, the extent to which the harm principle will serve as a principled limit 
on the use of state authority rests entirely on how "harm" is understood.  However, as numerous 
commentators have identified, the concept of "harm" presents several liabilities that undermine 
its ability to serve as a constraint on state authority.   
A complete address of the traditional criticisms leveled against the harm principle is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a few are worth noting here.  First, as noted by Dripps, the 
concept of harm is vague, "vague enough that proponents of morals laws could frequently point 
to some immediate consequence of private vice that can plausibly be characterized as harm."
i In 
																																																								
i This criticism is perhaps most problematic for subjective conceptions of harm, in which the existence of 
harm is determined by individual perception. Under this reading, “if people sincerely report that they have 
been ‘harmed’ by some occurrence, they have been.”  See Smith S. 2004. The Hallowness of The Harm 
Principle. University of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 05-07, at 20.  Harm would 
thus either be defined as the infliction of pain, or the frustration of one’s preferences.  
The challenge, however, is that under this reading, the potential scope of what 
constitutes harm is nearly limitless, for “[a]ny sort of conduct to which some people object will 
inflict pain of various sorts and will interfere with the satisfaction of some people’s 
preferences.”  As a result, the harm principle becomes entirely incapable of serving as a limit to 
state action, and therefore fails to give individual liberty the priority required by liberal 
morality.   
  An alternative approach to the subjective definition of harm would be to define harm in narrower 
terms.  Mill himself suggests this approach in his description of harm as an act that injures the interests of 
another, “or rather (injures) certain interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 50	
	
contemporary public health debates, this is particularly challenging for assessments of non-
physical harms, such as negative financial externalities borne by third-parties.  It seems 
implausible to hold the effects of economic burdens on others as irrelevant for the purposes of 
regulatory decision-making.  However, if economic burdens are to be considered as harms, the 
distinction between the realm of private behavior and that which is open to public regulation. 
Second, the harm principle invites speculations of complex causal chains that, at their 
extreme, stretch the limits of credulity.  Among the most creative attributions in the public health 
literature include those pertaining to motorcycle helmet laws, which have been alleged to 
respond to the need to protect other motorists from accidents caused by helmetless cyclists who 
may be struck by flying rocks and lose control.
75  Such arguments are also becoming 
increasingly prevalent as tobacco control efforts expand to restrictions on smoking in parks and 
other outdoor spaces, which has been alleged to protect young children from the risk of 
witnessing smoking behavior that might encourage future smoking.
76   
Such arguments reveal that conduct which affects oneself and that which affects others is 
often not an either-or distinction, but rather a matter of degree.  As Mill himself notes, ““No 
person is entirely an isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or 
																																																																																																																																																																																			
understanding, ought to be considered as rights.”  At first blush, this seems sensible; it can’t be that every 
injury can justify legal restrictions.  It isn’t the role of the state to interfere if, to take an example from 
Mill, my business fails because you open a more successful store across the street that drives me into 
bankruptcy. Certainly I’m negatively affected, perhaps even deeply so, but this impact doesn’t seem to 
merit state action.   
	 The	challenge,	however,	is	that by making “harm” dependent on some concept of pre-existing 
“rights”, harm becomes a normative concept. See Gray J. 2000. Mill’s Liberalism & Liberalism’s 
Posterity. The Journal of Ethics, 4(1/2): 137-165, at 147.  Therefore, rather than providing an objective 
criterion, the harm principle instead “hinges on assessments of the relative severity of harms that, in their 
dependency on disputed conceptions of the good life, are inherently controversial.” This constrains the 
ability of policymakers to maintain neutrality between different conceptions of the good, thereby 
undermining a central value of the liberal state.  This is a particularly devastating blow to Mill’s harm 
principle, as it deprives it of what has been presented as the chief aim of the principle, namely, to “settl[e] 
issues about restraint of liberty that arise between people of different moral outlooks.” See Gray J. at 147. 
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permanently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and 
often far beyond them.”
77  Yet, as it is framed by Mill, the harm principle’s ability to distinguish 
between impermissible and permissible reasons for state coercion is contingent upon the 
presence of such a distinction.  In its absence, any possible protection the harm principle might 
provide against impermissible intrusions upon individual liberty is eviscerated.  
While the issue was present even in Mill’s era, this concern for the potential for 
expansive attributions of causal harm is magnified by two features of contemporary society.  
First, individuals are dramatically more interconnected than at the time of On Liberty’s 
publication in 1859.  Second, the tools of modern social science have dramatically expanded our 
contemporary understandings of causation, increasingly revealing the mechanisms by which 
seemingly self-regarding behavior affects others.   
This expansion, coupled with the aformentioned vague nature of harm, means we are 
increasingly able to demonstrate that harm can be linked to nearly every human action.  
Consequently, the harm principle, rather than serving as a bulwark against intrusive state 
coercion, may in fact provide the justification for a broad range of coercive state regulations.  As 
described by John Gray: “the problem is that, once the trip-wire set by the [harm principle] has 
been crossed, even trivial harms to others could sanction substantial restrains of liberty.  The 
protection afforded the priority of liberty by Mill’s principle, though apparently stringent, is for 
this reason in reality slight.”
78 
Given contemporary understandings of causation, therefore, the relevant question is not 
whether an action causes harm, but rather explores the nature and the extent of the harm.
79  On 
these issues, however, the harm principle is frustratingly silent.  Further, the harm principle gives 
little consideration for the liberty interests attached to the regulated activity--a strange omission 52	
	
for a principle purportedly directed at protecting individual liberty from government overreach.  
As a result, the harm principle provides little guidance for how to consider and evaluate whether 
liberty is better protected by state regulation or by its absence. 
  Given these limitations, I propose that the Millian harm principle is ill-equipped to frame 
the relevant liberty considerations posed by questions of public health policy, and thus fails to 
provide adequate protection for individual liberty.  I therefore suggest that we need an alternative 
framework, one that better supports our ability to identify and weigh the trade-offs involved in 
decisions over whether--and how--to regulate in the name of protecting and promoting the 
public's health.  In Section 2.4, I propose such an alternative. 
 
2.4  RAWLS AND THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGITIMACY 
In Section 2.3, I argued that Mill’s framing of legitimacy as dependent upon the reasons 
given for a law fails to provide adequate consideration for the effects of a law upon individual 
liberty.  In this section, I will suggest that John Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy offers a 
potential alternative test of legitimacy, one which places consideration of the law’s effects on 
liberty front and center in an analysis of the appropriate scope of government authority.  
  Rawls describes the test of legitimacy as follows “Political power is legitimate only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all 
citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason.”
80 
This, for Rawls, is the “liberal principle of legitimacy.”   53	
	
According to Rawls, a legitimate law is one that, among other requirements,
ii is exercised 
in accordance with a legitimation-worthy constitution.  Consequently, the law must be consistent 
with a constitution that secures the constitutional essentials established by the first principle of 
justice, which demands that:
81 “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties 
for all.”
82 
In establishing this requirement, Rawls, like Mill, aims to secure for individuals a zone of 
non-interference over some range of choices.  Unlike Mill, however, the zone Rawls protects is 
delineated not by the motivation or reason given for government action, but instead by the effect 
resulting from this action upon a defined set of liberties.  Specifically, the legitimacy of a law is 
judged by its effects on basic liberties, defined by Rawls as including the following: 
a)  freedom of thought 
b)  liberty of conscience 
c)  the political liberties 
d)  freedom of association 
e)  freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person 
f)  the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law 
83,iii 
 
																																																								
ii Frank Michelman suggests that this formulation actually creates three distinct tests, each which must be 
met to ensure the requirements of legitimacy are fulfilled.  The additional tests include first the 
procedural component, namely, that the law must be passed in a series of events in accordance with the 
rules for lawmaking that are either constitutionally prescribed or prescribed in accordance with 
constitutional prescriptions. Additionally, the constitution itself must be what Frank Michelman has 
described as “legitimation-worthy.”  That is, the constitution must be such that it is sufficiently acceptable 
to individuals who hold what may be vastly different conceptions of the good, providing them with 
reasons that they can be expected to endorse.  While I find all three tests are likely relevant in evaluating 
the legitimacy of public health authority, the question of whether or not a specific regulatory act meets the 
“content” test seems the most pressing.  I therefore restrict my analysis to this question.   
iii In presenting the basic liberties in this way, I borrow heavily from Frank Michelman.  See Michelman 
F. The Priority of Liberty: Rawls and ‘Tiers of Scrutiny’. In: Brooks T, Nussbaum M, eds. Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism. New York, Columbia University Press, Forthcoming.  Available via SSRN: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1927292. Accessed December 5, 2013. 54	
	
According to Rawls, these liberties delineate the boundaries of individual freedom which 
legislative majorities are obligated to respect.  Further, these liberties are given what Rawls terms 
an “an absolute weight,” or special status, one which has lexical priority over considerations of 
social or economic efficiency, and thus cannot be traded away in order to promote policies 
needed for economic efficiency or growth.
84  Following from this priority, “a basic liberty can be 
limited or denied only for the sake of one or more other basic liberties.”
85  Individuals are thus 
afforded a zone of protection from interferences with negative liberty, one that gives a central 
role to respecting the capacity of individuals to have, to revise, and to rationally pursue a 
conception of the good.
86 
This priority of liberty, however, is not to be read as an all-encompassing restriction on 
laws restricting individual freedom of action.  “No priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the 
exercise of something called ‘liberty’ has a preeminent value and is the main if not the sole end 
of political and social justice.”
iv  The protection of liberty afforded to individuals by Rawls is 
distinct from libertarian liberty.  Specifically, while “there is, to be sure, a general presumption 
against imposing legal and other restrictions on conduct without sufficient reasons...this 
presumption creates no special priority for any particular liberty.”
87 
Instead, the priority given to basic liberties is tightly linked to Rawls’s conception of the 
person as reasonable and rational, alternatively described as possessing the two powers of moral 
personality: “the capacity for a sense of right and justice (and thus to be reasonable), and the 
capacity for a conception of the good (and thus to be rational).”
88  The basic liberties and their 
																																																								
iv This statement reflects Rawls’s modification of the initial account of the basic liberties as presented in 
A Theory of Justice, motivated by H.L.A. Hart’s critical review (Hart HLA, Rawls on Liberty and Its 
Priority, University of Chicago Law Review. 1973; 40(3):551-55.  Among his critiques, Hart noted that 
Rawls’s initial discussion of the priority of liberty in Theory of Justice at times used arguments that 
suggested the priority of liberty was to be understood as libertarian liberty.  In Political Liberalism, Rawls 
agreed with Hart’s observation, and clarified how his claims related to the priority of liberty were to be 
understood as applying only to the basic liberties, not liberty writ large. 55	
	
priority are "to guarantee equally for all citizens the social conditions essential for the adequate 
development and the full and informed exercise of these powers…”
89   
It would be hard to overstate the importance of these two powers within a Rawlsian 
conception of justice.  These powers are fundamental in securing for individuals the status as a 
fully cooperating member of society, comprising “the necessary and sufficient condition for 
being counted a full and equal member of society in questions of political justice.”
90  Further, 
these powers (in cooperation with other features of the two principles) secure for individuals the 
basis for self-respect, the presence of which secures for us a “sense of our own value rooted in 
the conviction that we can carry out a worthwhile plan of life”
91—and the absence of which 
causes individuals to doubt their own value and the value of their plan of life, as well as their 
capacity to pursue it.
92 
  From this discussion of the priority of liberty and its rationale, we are provided with a 
mechanism by which to adjudicate whether a specific law conforms to the content of the 
constitution.  Laws which restrict a basic liberty are only justified insofar as they are necessary to 
secure one or more other basic liberties.  When two liberty interests conflict, we are to look to 
the significance of the liberties for the development and exercise of the two moral powers.  
Again, quoting Rawls, “a liberty is more or less significant dependent on whether it is more or 
less essentially involved in, or it is a more or less necessary institutional means to protect, the 
full and informed and effective exercise of the moral powers.”
93  Thus, when faced with such a 
liberty conflict, the relevant criterion that should guide our action is that which will “allow the 
adequate development and the full and informed exercise of [the] moral powers.”
94    
While far more could be said about Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, I propose that 
this admittedly rough summary suggests three potential advantages of Rawls’s conception of 56	
	
legitimacy over Mill’s harm principle.  First, it gives central consideration to the effects of a law 
on individual liberty, and clearly defines which effects on liberty merit consideration.  Second, it 
acknowledges the reality that different liberty interests often conflict; and third, it provides a 
means by which to adjudicate such liberty conflicts, if and when they occur.   
 With these potential advantages in mind, I will explore how Rawls’s account of 
legitimacy might guide our evaluation of the legitimacy of public health regulations. I will begin 
by analyzing what I believe is a fairly uncontroversial case: the use of coercive state authority 
through public health laws aimed at the control of infectious disease.  I find that Rawls’s 
legitimacy principle, while offering greater protection for individual liberties, is nevertheless 
capable of justifying the use of public health authority in a situation where the use of such 
authority is largely uncontested.  From there, I will explore recent policy debates about two 
issues at the forefront of modern public health: smoking and obesity.  The analysis of these 
cases, I will argue, demonstrates that the Rawlsian framework both offers a better framework 
than the harm principle for the identification and consideration of relevant liberty interests posed 
by new public health measures, and may even offer a more robust protection for individual 
liberty.   
2.4.1  Rawls, Individual Rights, & Public Health Authority 
To introduce the account of how Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy might be used to 
evaluate the legitimacy of coercive state authority, and how that approach might differ from that 
of Mill, I begin with a case that is generally held as a clearly legitimate role of public health 
authority: epidemic disease control. 
The 1905 Supreme Court case of Jacobson v Massachusetts,
95 arguably the most famous 
legal decision in public health law, offers a prime example of a case in which individual liberty 57	
	
was constrained in the name of protecting public health.  The case involved a mandatory 
vaccination requirement imposed by the City of Cambridge, MA, in response to an epidemic of 
smallpox.  The case was challenged by Henning Jacobson, who objected to the measure as an 
undue violation of his liberty interests.  How would the Mill and Rawls each adjudicate this 
case? 
For Mill, an epidemic of contagious disease seems to offer a clear case in which the state 
can be said to be acting to prevent harm to others from contagion.  As this provides a legitimate 
reason for government action under Mill's framework, state coercion would be permitted, 
including the imposition of requirements for mandatory vaccination. 
For Rawls, the result would be similar, but it would rest upon a somewhat different 
justification.  To assess the legitimacy of the measure, Rawls's legitimacy principle would 
require us to first examine whether it violated a basic liberty.  Here, the answer is 
straightforward: mandatory vaccination poses an obvious restriction on the basic liberty listed 
above as (e), those freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person.  The next step, 
therefore, is to assess whether or not this restriction is permissible: is liberty being restricted for 
the sake of another basic liberty?    
As the justification for mandatory vaccination is to protect the integrity of the person 
from the transmission of infectious disease, Rawls’s framework would permit restricting this 
liberty, as it is being undertaken so as to secure the very same liberty for others. Such restriction 
is wholly consistent with the state’s goal of securing the equal right of each person to a “fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme for all.”
96   
In this manner, Rawls's reasoning is remarkably similar to the actual language presented 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in their decision upholding the vaccination requirement.  Writing for 58	
	
the majority, Justice Harlan notes that while the state affords considerable protections to 
individual liberties, 
…the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to  
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right  
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed  
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good…‘Even liberty itself, the  
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's  
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to  
the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is then liberty regulated  
by law.’ 
95 
 
In this case, the Rawlsian approach also parallels that of Mill.  When assessing conduct 
that can physically harm others, the two principles seem to converge.  Rawls's liberal principle of 
legitimacy therefore seems at least as good as Mill's principle in holding as legitimate a generally 
uncontested case of public health authority.  I will now turn to examining how the principle 
might address contemporary public health policies for obesity and smoking, with an eye to 
exploring whether Rawls's principle might have some advantages to the Millian approach. 
 
2.4.2  Obesity, Negative Externalities, and the Case of Mandatory Exercise 
In the earlier discussion of the harm principle, I suggested that the principle provides 
inadequate protection for individual liberty.  This occurs, I suggested, as a result of two 
conceptual ambiguities inherent in the harm principle: the vague nature of harm, and the absence 
of a clear-cut distinction between conduct that affects only oneself and conduct that also affects 
others.  The issues posed by these ambiguities are thrown into sharp relief when applied to 
obesity, a condition that at the center of recent policy debates over the appropriate scope of 
government authority.   59	
	
In the past three decades, adult obesity rates have more than doubled, from 15 percent in 
1976-1980
97 to over 35% by 2010.
98  Recently classified as a disease in its own right,
99 obesity is 
also associated with a host of both short- and long-term health conditions, including heart 
disease, diabetes, various cancers, respiratory disorders, arthritis, and reproductive 
complications.
100  Consequently, obesity is associated with a 50-100% increased risk of 
premature death from all causes.
100  
  In addition to its extensive health burden, obesity also takes a substantial financial toll.  
In a widely cited 2009 study on the impact of obesity on aggregate health spending, Finkelstein 
et al. estimated that the direct costs of obesity may be as high as $147 billion per year, or nearly 
10% of total annual medical expenditures.
101  A more recent estimate by Cawley and 
Meyerhoefer finds costs may actually be twice as high, accounting for 20% of health 
expenditures ($190 billion in 2005 dollars).
102  The economic toll of obesity is even higher when 
indirect effects are included, such as employee absenteeism and productivity,
103 workers 
compensation claims,
104 and even increased fuel costs.
105 
  Proponents of obesity regulation have pointed to these financial costs as justification for 
various policy strategies, including taxation of sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs),
106 restricting 
the portion size of SSBs,
107 and menu labeling.
108   To such proponents, the case of obesity 
represents a market failure, as obese individuals do not bear the full cost of their condition.  In 
the language of economics, obesity represents a negative externality problem, in which a cost is 
borne by an external party--in this case, taxpayers, employers, and coworkers.
109   
Thus, as a result of this negative externality, seemingly self-regarding behaviors such as 
diet and physical activity levels can have widespread effects on other individuals, and upon the 
broader society.  When these effects are aggregated across the population, they can result in 60	
	
substantial costs for individuals in the form of increased taxation, insurance premiums, and 
suppressed wages.  A recent study by Cawley and Meyerhoefer estimated the annual "third 
party" expenditures (in the form of increased insurance premiums and taxation) at $3,220 for an 
obese female and $967 for an obese male.
102  
  Given the magnitude of the financial costs incurred on non-obese individuals, a 
reasonable case can be made that the negative externalities associated with obesity constitute a 
harm to others that legitimates government intervention.  Nevertheless, taking this harm principle 
approach is not without cost.  While the justification of financial harms may offer support for 
obesity policies desired by some public health advocates, it also risks opening the door to 
conclusions that many liberals would find undesirable, or even abhorrent.   
  These risks have not been lost on critics of the so-called "nanny state."  In a Fox News 
segment, Ann Coulter (herself an advocate of gay rights), noted that if the justification for 
smoking or obesity regulation is that "we all have to pick up the tab," then a consistent approach 
might demand restrictions on gay bathhouses, given the societal costs of HIV/AIDS.
110  
Similarly, in a scathing commentary on recent public health policy proposals, Jacob Sullum 
argued that, if the financial harms of obesity justify taxes on junk foods or bans on fast food 
restaurants, then they also could justify mandatory calisthenics in the town square.
111    
The critiques by Coulter and Sullum suggest the harm principle may prove deficient as an 
external constraint on government authority in public health.  Once a plausible case has been 
made for considering such negative externalities as harms, Mill’s harm principle can no longer 
serve as a limit on government intervention.  Instead, rather than providing a protecting zone of 
non-interference for individual liberty, the harm principle may actually serve as the justification 61	
	
for a broad range of intrusive government activities.  Thus, “[t]he principle that was once a shield 
of individual liberty has been forged into a sword against it.”
112   
Critics of expansive public health authority have argued that the fault lies not with the 
harm principle itself, but rather with arguments for public health policies that “boot-strap” a 
justification for further government intervention based upon existing government interference in 
the market.  The remedy, they argue, is not to do away with the harm principle, but rather to end 
the government-subsidized programs such as Medicare and Medicaid which force individuals to 
pay the health care costs resulting from other people’s unhealthy decisions.  As taxpayer-funded 
subsidization of health care is itself objectionable, they argue, using financial harms as the 
justification for regulation would only exacerbate existing infringements on individual liberty 
resulting from a system of redistributive taxation.  
This objection, however, takes too narrow a view towards the financial impacts of 
obesity.  It is certainly true that government programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the 
insurance subsidies offered through the Affordable Care Act create a system of cross-
subsidization in which one person’s decision to choose fries over broccoli results in financial 
implications for others via taxation.  However, the financial costs of obesity affect other 
individuals in diverse manners unrelated to these government programs, perhaps most 
significantly through the risk pooling in insurance that leads to increased premiums for 
individuals and/or their employers.  While government-funded insurance programs may 
exacerbate the financial negative externalities associated with obesity, they are far from the sole 
contributor.  Therefore, the issues associated with a harm principle approach are not easily 
explained away by ending government subsidization of health care. 62	
	
In contrast, the Rawlsian principle of legitimacy seems to provide a robust defense of 
liberty against the “mission creep” risk that worries Coulter and Sullum.  For example, Sullum’s 
proposal of mandatory exercise would clearly infringe on the basic liberty associated with (e), 
the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person.  As the priority of liberty 
prohibits basic liberties from being traded away for considerations of social or economic 
efficiency--including those resulting from costs associated with obesity--the Rawlsian legitimacy 
principle could clearly strike Sullum's proposal as an illegitimate use of government authority.   
Unlike the Millian approach, however, the Rawlsian approach does not require a 
categorical decision on the legitimacy of obesity policies motivated by economic considerations.  
By focusing on the effects of the regulatory approach on individual liberties, rather than the 
justification, Rawls's principle still gives space for other, less intrusive obesity interventions.  For 
example, under a Rawlsian framework, menu labeling requirements would seem to fall well 
within the permissible scope of government authority.  While the regulation compels restaurant 
owners to display caloric information on menus and menu boards, requiring a factual disclosure 
of information parallels commonly accepted standards of disclosure, including product liability 
law requirements that manufacturers warn about (some of) the dangers associated with their 
goods, or the requirements of informed consent that health care professionals warn of the risks 
and benefits of medical procedures.
113  Rawls’s decision here would therefore likely parallel that 
of the 2
nd circuit, which upheld NYC’s regulations, holding that the First Amendment protections 
of restaurants to engage in commercial speech was not violated, as the law in question mandated 
(only) a “simple factual disclosure of caloric information” that was “reasonably related to New 
York City’s goals of combating obesity.”
113 Further, while the policy may affect basic liberties of 
restaurant patrons with respect to liberties (a) and (b), freedom of thought and liberty of 63	
	
conscience, it arguably acts not to restrict such liberties, but rather to promote them, for the 
requirement for the provision of basic, factual information brings more, not less, speech into the 
information marketplace.  While the regulation deliberately places the information where 
individual consumers are apt to notice it, a placement which may admittedly—even 
deliberately—work to shape individual choices, individual consumers are nevertheless free to 
ignore the information provided.
114   
This analysis demonstrates the contrast between the two approaches of Mill and Rawls.  
For Mill, the inquiry turns entirely upon whether or not a harm can be said to exist.  Once a harm 
is demonstrated, there is no means by which to distinguish the appropriate form or extent of 
coercive government strategies to address the harm.  In contrast, by focusing on the effects on 
liberty, Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy provides a test by which to distinguish between 
impermissible and permissible uses of government authority to address obesity.  Calorie posting 
laws, posing no restriction on basic liberties, are permissible.  Mandatory exercise laws, in 
contrast, infringe the integrity of the person (and not for the sake of any other basic liberty), and 
are therefore out.   
 
2.4.3  Extending Smoking Regulation into Private Homes: The Case of Belmont City, CA 
The Rawlsian approach may also offer some advantages over the Millian approach in 
assessing the legitimacy of a recent shift in smoking regulation.  In 2007, the City of Belmont, 
California, citing the medical and economic toll of tobacco smoke for nonsmokers, passed an 
ordinance prohibiting smoking in a range of settings, including indoor and outdoor workplaces; 
outdoor spaces such as parks, sports fields and stadiums, and recreation trails; and multi-unit 
housing residences.
115  64	
	
On one hand, Belmont’s action represents only the most recent in a decades-long rise in 
regulatory action aimed at reducing the harms of secondhand smoke.  Driven by a steadily 
accumulating body of epidemiologic research secondhand smoke exposure to numerous health 
problems, including elevated risks of lung cancer, cardiovascular disease, and acute asthma 
episodes, legislative bodies at all levels of government have steadily moved to restrict smoking 
within enclosed spaces, including transportation on planes and buses, as well as in schools, 
restaurants, and private workplaces.    
On the other hand, Belmont’s actions may also be seen as a dramatic break with earlier 
tobacco control efforts.  By banning smoking in multi-unit residences such as apartments and 
condominiums, Belmont’s actions extend tobacco regulation into private homes—spaces long 
considered to be “beyond the legitimate reach of (tobacco) regulation.”
48 Additionally, by 
drawing a distinction between multi-family and single-family homes, Belmont’s actions have 
raised considerations of fairness.  By focusing on the harm to others posed by secondhand 
smoke, Belmont City’s policy applies a different standard of regulation to citizens based upon 
their housing status.  As a result, the city’s approach may disproportionately affect low-income 
and minority residents, who are more likely to live in multi-family households.  Taking a 
different perspective on fairness, the ban might also work to remediate an existing disparity, as 
low-SES and minority populations are also disproportionately affected by secondhand 
smoke.
116,117 
With respect to each of these considerations, Mill’s principle seems to offer little 
guidance, as neither privacy nor fairness are considerations that are easily incorporated into a 
Millian evaluation of legitimacy. From the perspective of the harm principle, the issue of 
legitimacy is decided solely upon the basis of whether a harm to others exists. On this issue, the 65	
	
harm principle seems to offer clear guidance.  While “harm” is a contested concept, there is 
generally little dispute that the negative health effects of secondhand smoke are legitimate 
grounds for government intervention.  Further, there seems to be sufficient evidence that 
secondhand smoke can pose a risk to health in multifamily homes.  The epidemiological 
literature is replete with studies documenting the associations between exposure to secondhand 
smoke and numerous health problems, including elevated risks of lung cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, and acute asthma episodes.  Evidence also exists that tobacco smoke can move so as to 
affect other units in a multiunit residential building beyond that of the smoker, via such conduits 
as air ducts, cracks in walls or floors, elevator shafts, or even plumbing and power lines.
48,118   
In light of both the known effects of secondhand smoke, as well as the potential for 
secondhand smoke to travel into other residential units within a multiunit building, this 
regulation seems to sit squarely within the bounds set by the harm principle.   As the health 
effects of secondhand smoke within enclosed spaces can be clearly demonstrated, a legitimate 
motivation exists to justify state regulation that restricts individual liberty.  
 While this rationale can provide justification for a law that advances a public health goal, 
it is nevertheless silent about the two complaints at the center of recent debates over the measure.  
To be fair, nothing about the harm principle says the state must regulate (harm is a necessary, not 
sufficient condition).  The harm principle would certainly leave open the possibility to weigh 
considerations of fairness against the potential health gains and make a determination of whether 
the policy should be implemented.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that there is nothing within the 
harm principle that allows such considerations to be evaluated as matters of legitimacy--they 
would only be included as matters of pragmatism.    66	
	
To these limitations, I suggest, the Rawlsian principle of legitimacy may offer at least a 
partial remedy.  First, while privacy is not listed among the basic liberties, the principle might 
still provide some guidance for how it should be included in considerations of legitimacy.  
Further, the demand for equal basic liberties builds in consideration for the differential effects of 
regulation on different population subgroups.  In the remainder of this section, I will discuss each 
of these considerations.   
At first blush, there is little in the legitimacy principle that would seem to demand 
considerations of privacy.  No explicit protection for privacy is included in the equal basic 
liberties.  Furthermore, there is nothing in the legitimacy principle that would suggest that the 
home is somehow to be considered off-limits from either government regulation or the demands 
of justice.  On the contrary, Rawls is quite explicit to refute such claims broad claims for privacy, 
claiming “If the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from justice, then there 
is no such thing.”
119  Any value attached to private space exists only insofar as the home works 
to secure for individuals the conditions necessary for the protection of the basic liberties and the 
development and exercise of the two moral powers.  
Nevertheless, the Rawlsian framework might be seen as providing a contextual argument 
for privacy.
120  Specifically, privacy might be seen as demanding protection because it creates 
the contextual conditions necessary for the exercise of other activities deemed essential.  For 
example, privacy enables development of individuality by allowing individuals the space to 
differentiate between their own thoughts and feelings and those of others
120—a clear requirement 
for the development of the capacity for an independent conception of the good.  Further, by 
restricting physical access to an individual, privacy insulates the individual from distraction, a 
freedom “essential for all human activities that require concentration,”
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argued, the development of moral judgment associated with the capacity of reasonableness, or 
the willingness to accept fair terms of cooperation, provided others are willing to do likewise.  
Consequently, privacy might be seen as implicating (at least) three basic liberties: freedom of 
thought, freedom of association, and liberty of conscience.    
In this way, Rawls’s principle offers at least a framework by which we might consider 
privacy-based arguments.  For example, it might suggest the need for consideration as to the 
privacy implications associated with the law’s enforcement, as permitting state intrusion into the 
home for purposes of ascertaining smoking behaviors might undermine the protections necessary 
to secure basic liberties implicated in an individual’s development and exercise of the two moral 
powers.  If enforcement had this effect, it would suggest that Belmont’s law presents an example 
of a case in which liberty interests might be said to conflict.   Faced with this conflict, we would 
then look to the significance of the liberties for the development and exercise of the two moral 
powers.  
Admittedly, these considerations do not offer a straightforward answer on the issue of 
whether privacy-based claims might be sufficient to render Belmont’s actions as impermissible.  
Nevertheless, the liberty principle offers at least the means by which to acknowledge that liberty 
interests might be in tension, while providing some guidance as to how to weigh the competing 
liberty interests. 
  Finally, we turn to how the Rawlsian approach might inform considerations of fairness.  
Here, the guidance from Rawls seems more straightforward.  Rawls make clear that compliance 
with the principle of justice demands that individuals have “an equal right to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”
121 
Thus, in evaluating the effects of the smoking ban, we are directed to weigh not only the effect of 68	
	
the law on basic liberties, but also how the distribution of those liberties works to affirm the 
status of individuals as free and equal persons.  Rawls’s principle therefore goes beyond Mill, 
demanding not only considerations of the risks associated with secondhand smoke, but also 
considerations of how the burdens of both smoking and its regulation are distributed.  Again, 
while a Rawlsian analysis might get us to the same place as Mill in holding the ban as 
permissible, it seems better able to acknowledge and consider considerations of particular 
importance to liberalism. 
  Therefore, the case of smoking in private homes provides an example of a case where the 
Rawlsian legitimacy approach may provide a justifiable objection to a policy for which Mill 
could offer no objection.  While the test of legitimacy ends, for Mill, with a determination of 
harm, the Rawlsian approach provides a framework for consideration of other morally relevant 
features, including the impact of the regulation on privacy and fairness. 
 
2.5  POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE RAWLSIAN APPROACH 
While the Rawlsian principle seems to offer advantages over the Millian approach in 
aforementioned cases of epidemic smallpox control, obesity, and smoking, it may admittedly 
face other limitations.  One potential criticism of the Rawlsian approach is that provides no 
general doctrine of a class of aims or concerns that are simply off-limits to government 
regulation.  Therefore, while the principle can strike down an intervention for excessive 
infringing upon individual rights, it excludes arguments that a law is illegitimate for extending 
the state’s authority into an area that is altogether inappropriate for state action.   69	
	
In excluding such claims, Rawls’s principle may be limited in its ability to protect 
activities traditionally defended by liberals as areas inappropriate for government regulation.  
Thus, as noted by H.L.A. Hart: 
…it seems obvious that there are important forms of liberty 
—sexual freedom and the liberty to use alcohol or drugs among  
them—which apparently do not fall within any of the roughly  
described basic liberties; yet it would be very surprising if 
principles of justice were silent about them.
122 
  
If the legitimacy principle were to be silent on these issues, the Rawlsian approach might 
seem unable to defend against various illiberal uses of the law, including the use of the law to 
enforce morality.  On this point, Mill seems to have a clear advantage.  The harm principle, in no 
uncertain terms, holds that it is not a legitimate function of the state to punish conduct simply on 
the grounds that it is immoral.  In contrast, Rawls cannot set such laws as simply outside the 
legitimate scope of government authority. 
This may pose a real limitation of the Rawlsian approach with respect to certain laws that 
some liberals might find objectionable.  Nevertheless, I suggest the scope of this risk is narrower 
than it might first appear.  Specifically, I believe the basic liberties do offer robust protection for 
many such laws.  Take, for instance, laws restricting sodomy or fornication.  While Rawls cannot 
categorically exclude such restrictions, his approach nevertheless offers substantial protections 
for liberty of conscience that would greatly limit the permissible scope of such liberty-limiting 
restrictions.  For, as Frank Michelman has previously argued with respect to Rawls’s basic 
liberties, liberty of conscience is must be understood as protecting: 
not just the allowance of being internally in touch with one’s 
conscientious deliberations and occasion-specific deliberative 
outcomes, but the allowance to live out one’s conscientious 
convictions and decisions—to give them, in that way, expression 
and endorsement…claiming them as one’s own in the only way 
that can be fully and finally credible to oneself and others.
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At minimum, the protection of liberty of conscience therefore offers substantial protection for 
sexual freedoms, which can be viewed as central to an individual’s conception of the good. 
Therefore, while Rawls does not expressly prohibit the entire class of such objectionable laws, 
his principle may nevertheless offer protection against at least the most egregious forms.   
  An additional response to Hart’s concern is suggested by Michelman’s observation that 
Rawls’s statement of the two principles of justice (and the associated discussion of the liberal 
principle of legitimacy) “does not exhaust the normative content of the political conception of 
justice as fairness.”
124  The normative content of Rawls’s conception of justice also includes an 
expectation about how those constitutionally protected liberties will have their meanings filled 
out in application.  This application includes, among other things, Rawls’s conception of public 
reason, which governs the way in which citizens should “deliberate together about the 
fundamental questions of their political life.”
125  When engaged in political deliberation, citizens 
should reason from premises which they all can acknowledge.  Substantive views of what the 
good life is, or what makes for a good life are therefore excluded from debate over what is and is 
not a basic right.    
To explain how the requirement of public reason can further inform contested debates over 
the extent of liberty, Michelman offers the case of same sex marriage.  If the debate over same 
sex marriage is restricted within the bounds of Rawlsian public reason, the most common 
objections to same-sex relationships would be excluded.  Opposition to same-sex relationships, 
according to Rawls, can only reflect some religious or otherwise sectarian comprehensive moral 
doctrine, reasons that fall outside the scope of public reason.
126 
Incorporating the demands of public reason therefore seems to offer additional protections 
for at least some forms of liberty identified by Hart.  For questions of constitutional essentials 71	
	
and basic justice, Rawlsian public reason will serve to substantially restrict, if not outright 
exclude, many controversial restrictions on liberty not explicitly addressed by the basic liberties, 
including such issues as contraception, same-sex partnerships, and abortion.  It is less clear, 
however, what response Rawls might offer to Hart regarding day-to-day legislative deliberations, 
to which the demands of public reason do not apply.   
One possible response would be to bite the bullet and concede that Rawls’s principle 
would not hold as illegitimate many of the restrictions on liberty to which Hart refers, including 
regulations pertaining to the use of alcohol or drugs.  We might therefore understand Rawls’s 
principle as setting up a system akin to the two-tier model of scrutiny applied by U.S. courts in 
judicial review.
123  Under this reading, only those regulations affecting basic liberties would 
merit the heightened review demanded by the liberal principle of legitimacy.  All other 
regulations would be required only to meet a lesser standard, akin to the rational basis test in 
U.S. constitutional law, demanding only that the government’s goal be a legitimate public 
interest, and the means selected be reasonable to meeting that (public health) goal.   
Thus, while I have proposed the scope of Hart’s concern is narrower than initially 
supposed, I concede that further work need to be done to identify whether and how a more 
complete response might be offered from within Rawlsian theory. 
 
2.6  CONCLUSION 
The traditional framing of Mill’s harm principle as the test for legitimacy in public health 
is plagued with numerous shortcomings.  Given these shortcomings, an alternative mechanism is 
needed by which to determine when public health authority is permissible—and when it is not.  
In this essay, I have suggested that Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy provides one such 72	
	
potential alternative.  To support this proposal, I have provided a sketch of how the Rawlsian 
approach might frame our evaluations of policies in three areas: epidemic smallpox control, 
obesity regulation, and bans on smoking in private homes.  These cases suggest that the 
Rawlsian approach might be least as good as Mill’s in evaluating well-accepted public health 
measures such as infectious disease control, while potentially offering advantages in the 
evaluation of newer measures such as those targeting noncommunicable disease.   
From this sketch, I cannot claim that the legitimacy principle will prove superior to the 
harm principle in all domains of public health regulation.  My proposal for the legitimacy 
principle as an alternative to Mill is, admittedly, a work in progress.  I have, however, proposed 
where further work is needed, including additional testing of the principle across various legal 
strategies targeting noncommunicable disease; and Hart’s objection regarding the apparent 
limitations of Rawlsian basic liberties to respond to restrictions of such non-basic liberties such 
as sexual freedom.  
I also leave open the possibility that other liberal approaches to legitimacy, beyond those 
offered by Mill or Rawls, may ultimately prove more defensible.  The search for alternative 
principles of legitimacy demands considerable analysis beyond the limited scope possible in this 
chapter.  At the very least, this paper should encourage further exploration of such alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Institutional Oversight of Faculty-Industry Consulting Relationships  
in U.S. Medical Schools: 
A Delphi Study 
3.1  BACKGROUND 
Consulting relationships between medical school faculty and the biopharmaceutical and 
medical device industries offer the potential to advance research and promote the translation of 
academic discoveries into applied technologies that can benefit the health of individuals and 
populations. Such relationships are common,
127,128 and studies suggest that faculty with industry 
relationships are more productive than their peers without such relationships, achieving higher 
rates of publication and conducting more service activities within their institutions or 
disciplines.127  Yet while interactions between faculty and industry can be beneficial in 
promoting innovation and improvement within our health care system, academic inquiries,
129,130 
government hearings,
131,132,133,134 and related litigation
135,136 have called attention to the potential 
risks associated with these relationships.  
Consulting relationships include a broad range of activities in which a faculty member 
provides advice or services to companies whose activities, products, or services relate to his/her 
area of professional expertise, typically in exchange for payment.  Consultants may act as 
individual contractors or as members of a board (e.g., scientific advisory board, board of 
directors, or data and safety monitoring board).   
Prior research on consulting relationships has primarily focused on the ethical issues 
surrounding financial conflicts of interest.  According to an Institute of Medicine committee 80	
	
report, a conflict of interest is “a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional 
judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary 
interest.”
137  From this perspective, industry ties raise concerns that faculty members may be 
financially incentivized to act in a manner that is inconsistent with their primary duties to 
universities, patients, research participants, trainees, and scholarly collaborators.  As prior 
observers have noted, these incentives may lead to various forms of problematic behavior.  
Within clinical trials, financial incentives may lead investigators to inappropriately enroll 
patients in clinical trials,
138,139 bias trials’ design, conduct or analysis,
140 or withhold results that 
are inconsistent with the economic objectives of the industry partner.
141,142,143  In addition, 
financial relationships may adversely affect the broader academic environment.  They may 
discourage open dissemination of research information and collaboration among academic 
colleagues or lead researchers to prioritize projects directed at specific industry goals.
144   As a 
result, commentators have raised the concern that financial relationships with industry may 
undermine the quality and trustworthiness of academic research, which may in turn jeopardize 
the public’s trust in both medicine and scientific inquiry.
145,146,147 
While financial conflicts of interest are well-studied, less attention has been paid to legal 
aspects of consulting activities.  Of particular interest include the terms of contracts that govern 
faculty-industry interactions.  Prior studies of a related topic, the terms of contracts for industry-
sponsored clinical trials, have raised concerns that companies may use such agreements as a 
vehicle to exert inappropriate control over academic researchers.
148,149 One recent study indicates 
that medical schools and schools of public health generally do not exercise oversight to prevent 
similar problems in the context of consulting agreements.
150   81	
	
  In this article, we report on a Delphi study of medical school administrators with 
expertise in the management of faculty consulting agreements.  Our primary purpose was to 
evaluate potential approaches for the oversight of such agreements so as to provide guidance for 
the management of faculty-industry consulting relationships.   
Consulting agreements may contain a wide range of provisions that restrict the freedom 
of faculty members in ways that may adversely affect their academic responsibilities and the 
interests of their universities.  These “restrictive provisions” might include limitations on the 
ability of faculty members to publish or disseminate information, make public statements that 
may be detrimental to the company’s interests, or participate in future professional activities, 
such as receiving grants or research contracts within a certain subfield.  These restrictions have 
the potential to curb academic and intellectual freedoms.  Although the prevalence of such 
provisions has not been measured, prior reports by faculty and research administrators on 
consulting agreements suggest they are far from infrequent.150,151 
These restrictive provisions affect not only the interests of the faculty member, but also 
those of the university with which they are affiliated.  This is clearly evident in the case of 
contract terms pertaining to intellectual property interests, which may conflict with other 
agreements the faculty member has entered into with the university concerning ownership of 
inventions.
152  Other contractual provisions also may reach beyond the interests of the faculty 
member to affect those of his/her institution and other parties, including research collaborators, 
trainees, and students.  Such provisions include confidentiality restrictions that extend to the 
dissemination rights of the faculty member’s students or trainees, or company assertions of 
intellectual property interests in the work of students or trainees.   82	
	
The issues raised by financial conflicts of interest have inspired efforts to mitigate the 
effects of these conflicts.  These include guidelines from the National Institutes of Health,
153 and 
the Association of American Medical Colleges,
154 recommendations from the Institute of 
Medicine,
155 uniform requirements for manuscripts submitted to biomedical journals,
156 and 
more recently, federal requirements for disclosure of relationships under the Physician Payment 
Sunshine Act.
157  However, aside from “conflicts of commitment” policies, which focus 
narrowly on ensuring that faculty do not devote excessive time to outside activities, neither legal 
rules, nor professional guidelines, nor expert consensus statements have emerged to guide 
medical schools in managing the non-financial aspects of consulting relationships.  Several 
organizations, including the Association of American Universities, in collaboration with the 
Business–Higher Education Forum,
158 and the Association of American Medical Colleges 
(AAMC)
159 have recommended general safeguards and institutional procedures for the 
management of academic–industry ties. These recommendations have drawn special attention to 
the need to avoid conflicts of interest that may compromise the integrity of clinical trials and the 
welfare of trial participants.  However, they do not generally address nonclinical research, 
including in vitro tests of drugs and devices or other studies that do not utilize human subjects, or 
non-research activities that faculty pursue as consultants, including the provision of advice on 
marketing or business development and expert witness testimony. 
In the absence of external guidance on the oversight of consulting agreements, academic 
medical centers vary considerably in the stance they have taken towards these relationships,150 
and have adopted a wide range of oversight mechanisms.  Examples include school-level policies 
restricting the percentage of time faculty may devote to outside activities (e.g., limiting to 1 day 
in a 5 or 7 day week) or the amount of outside income allowed as a proportion of annual salary.  83	
	
While some institutions have banned selected activities, such as speakers’ bureaus or 
ghostwriting, most exercise little or no oversight that extends beyond conflict-of-commitment 
and financial conflict of interest concerns.
160   
Of particular interest is the level of scrutiny that medical schools give to the terms of 
consulting agreements between faculty members and industry.  Research suggests that there is 
significant variation within the academic community in both the nature and scope of oversight.  
In a study of 127 medical schools and schools of public health, less than 20% of institutions 
reported that they required review of all consulting agreements, 15% required review of some 
types of agreements, 34% offered some form of optional review, and 30% had no review 
available.150  Among institutions that review faculty consulting agreements, wide variation exists 
in both the types of issues reviewed and the responses to problematic provisions.  In reviewing 
consulting agreements, many institutions focus solely on the institution’s intellectual property 
rights, with only a minority taking a broader perspective that incorporates such considerations as 
academic freedom.  Institutional responses to troubling provisions also vary considerably; 
approximately a third may prevent the faculty member from signing the contract, while the 
majority merely bring the issue to the faculty member’s attention and permit him/her discretion 
in how to proceed.150 
In the present study, we enlisted a panel of experienced medical school administrators to 
evaluate a range of potential approaches for oversight of faculty-industry consulting agreements.  
We sought to use these insights to develop recommendations for the improved management of 
consulting relationships.  Our findings highlight the types of contractual provisions that merit 
oversight, identify strategies for managing consulting agreements to protect important interests, 
and suggest key considerations for implementing these strategies. 84	
	
 
3.2  METHODS 
  We used modified Delphi methods to elicit administrators’ views about the oversight of 
faculty-industry consulting relationships.  The Delphi process, developed by RAND, is a method 
of structuring group communication to facilitate problem solving and synthesize expert 
opinion.
161,162 The technique has been used widely in health research, addressing ethical questions 
posed by conflicts of interest,
163 research and health priorities,
164,165 methodological criteria for 
randomized controlled trials,
166 and the development of nursing and clinical practice 
guidelines.
167,168,169, 
170 Typically, a panel of experts, usually 7-15 individuals, is selected for 
participation.  This size is large enough to permit diversity of representation while being small 
enough to allow everyone adequate voice in the process.
171  A survey is conducted in 2 or more 
rounds, using questionnaires designed to elicit and develop individual responses to the research 
question so as to enable the expert panel to refine its views.   
Following each round, the research team aggregates the responses and disseminates the 
data to the panelists, asking them to consider others’ responses in answering the same questions 
again in subsequent rounds.  This feedback enables clarification of issues, identification of areas 
of agreement and disagreement, and understanding of priorities.  This iterative process of 
feedback and review proceeds until the group reaches convergence on their perspectives of the 
issues examined, or until a predetermined number of survey rounds have been completed. 
Although aggregate responses are provided to all participants, opinions are not attributed 
to specific panel members.  This anonymity fosters expression of opinions and supports 
evaluation based upon the merit of the viewpoint rather than the status of the individual 
expressing it.  Anonymity also may minimize the need to “save face,” enabling individuals to 
change their views between rounds in response to the insights of their peers.   85	
	
Four characteristics of the current study make it particularly appropriate for exploration 
using the Delphi process.  First, developing an understanding of the problems, opportunities, and 
solutions presented by institutional oversight of faculty consulting agreements is a challenge that 
can benefit from analysis of subjective judgments from multiple perspectives.162,172  Second, 
developing “best practices” requires the exploration and assessment of numerous options for 
oversight mechanisms, which can benefit from the pooled judgment of relevant experts.162,172 
Third, the anonymity provided by the Delphi method’s structure reduces the influence of certain 
psychological factors, including the bandwagon effect of majority opinion and domination of the 
communication process by one vested interest or strong personality.
173  Finally, experts in this 
field have substantial time constraints and are widely dispersed geographically, making face-to-
face meetings infeasible.  The flexibility of the Delphi method enables participants to contribute 
according to their own schedules, minimizing burdens that might otherwise limit response rates.
 
3.2.1  Participant Selection 
Selection of the expert panelists in a Delphi study is a critical step, as their judgments 
form the basis of the study’s conclusions.  For this study, we recruited institutional administrators 
with responsibility for, or extensive knowledge of, institutional oversight of faculty consulting 
relationships at U.S. medical schools.  We selected this population because administrative 
officials are highly knowledgeable about relevant institutional policies and practices and the 
rationale for the approach the institution has taken to oversight of faculty consulting agreements.  
Our initial sampling frame was derived from a prior study in which we identified 
institutional officials within 127 accredited allopathic medical schools and schools of public 
health in the U.S. who had responsibility for institutional oversight of faculty consulting 
relationships.150  Because our earlier research suggested considerable heterogeneity across 86	
	
schools in their approaches to oversight, with some institutions reportedly having devoted little 
thought or attention to the issue, we aimed to recruit participants from those institutions that had 
given serious consideration to whether and how the school or university should attempt to manage 
the nonfinancial aspects of consulting relationships.  
We selected experts using a two-stage process.  First, we developed an initial list of 
medical schools using the following screening criteria, based upon findings from our prior 
research:   
(1) An institutional representative completed our earlier interview study of institutional 
consulting policies and agreed to be contacted for further research inquiries, and; 
(2) based on interview responses, the institution met any of the following conditions: 
(a) It had a required or optional review mechanism in place for consulting agreement 
oversight;  
(b) It had previously given serious consideration to the oversight of consulting 
agreements; 
(c) It was contemplating changes to its oversight of or approach to consulting 
agreements; 
(d) It had recently altered its procedures for oversight of or approach to consulting 
agreements; or 
(e) Its representative in our earlier interview study had offered detailed comments as 
to the relative merits or limitations of at least one oversight mechanism. 
  
Through application of these criteria, we arrived at an initial list of 29 candidate schools. 
Second, to prioritize participation by those institutions likely to have a high concentration 
of faculty consulting relationships, we ranked eligible institutions based upon their receipt of 
National Institute of Health grant funds as a proxy for research intensity, which we expected 
would be correlated with faculty being sought out as consultants.  We recruited individuals from 87	
	
the list until reaching our target number of 12 experts.    
We recruited participants via email and offered a $450 incentive for their estimated 4.5 
hours of participation. Participants’ informed consent was obtained and the study was approved 
by the Institutional Review Board of the Harvard School of Public Health, which also reviewed 
the study on behalf of the Dana Farber Cancer Institute and Partners HealthCare. 
 
3.2.2  Delphi Process 
We conducted this study in three stages: a first round survey, a second round survey 
incorporating summary results from the initial round, and a final panel teleconference. 
3.2.2.1  Survey Structure 
  Guided by the findings of our prior interview study of research administrators,150 we 
designed a 48-item survey instrument with structured response categories to elicit feedback on 
how institutions should approach three issues: the types of contractual provisions that may merit 
oversight; the oversight mechanisms schools may consider to manage consulting relationships; 
and whether medical schools should prohibit consulting for specific industries. Participants were 
also asked to provide comments to explain their ratings. 
To elicit feedback on the types of contractual provisions that may merit oversight, we 
developed a typology of restrictive provisions, based upon our earlier interview study.
150 
Participants rated the importance of oversight for 14 restrictive provisions using a 9-point scale.  
A rating of 9 indicated that oversight of the provision was extremely important, whereas a rating 
of 1 indicated oversight was extremely unimportant.  To interpret importance, we divided the 
scale into three-point ranges, using the following definitions modified from the RAND/UCLA 
appropriateness method: important: panel mean of 7-9, without disagreement; uncertain: panel 88	
	
mean of 4-6, or any mean with disagreement; unimportant: panel mean of 1-3, without 
disagreement.  Agreement and disagreement were determined by a modified classification 
structure established by the BIOMED Concerted Action on Appropriateness for panel sizes from 
11-13, where agreement is achieved when no more than 3 panelists provide ratings outside the 3-
point region containing the mean (1-3; 4-6; 7-9).  Participants also rated whether or not each 
provision was permissible, based upon a three-point categorical scale developed for this study 
(should generally be permitted and requires no institutional oversight; may be permissible, but 
only with institutional review and/or modification; and should generally be prohibited). 
Participants also rated 6 oversight mechanisms that schools might consider for the 
oversight of consulting agreements, based upon current practices as identified in our interview 
study: 1) mandatory review, 2) optional review, 3) required standard provisions, 4) negotiation 
assistance, 5) educational training, and 6) inclusion of the school as a party to the agreement.  
For each provision, participants were asked to rate the oversight mechanisms along 3 dimensions 
aimed to capture both their theoretical appeal and their practicality.  A 9-point scale was used for 
each dimension.  Participants first rated the logistical feasibility, a measure of the logistical 
burdens for implementation of the mechanism, including resource availability, legal barriers, and 
necessary expertise.  Participants then rated the level of faculty support, or how easy or difficult 
it would be to attract the necessary level of support from medical school faculty to enable 
implementation.  Finally, participants rated the overall advisability of each mechanism, to 
provide an overall indication of the extent to which they would advise for or against adoption of 
the proposed mechanism.  
Finally, participants considered whether faculty members’ consulting relationships with 
any industries, from a prespecified list of 10 industries, should generally be prohibited.  89	
	
3.2.2.2  Round 1 
We conducted the first round survey using REDCap Survey, a secure, web-based 
application.  Participants completed Round 1 between November 2012 and January 2013.  After 
all responses were collected, the research team generated descriptive statistics to identify the 
mean scores and distribution of responses to each question.  For each question, one member of 
the research team (SM) reviewed respondents’ qualitative comments and synthesized them into a 
list of explanations for high and low ratings. 
 
3.2.2.3  Round 2 
The second survey was fielded in February 2013.  During Round 2, we provided 
participants with the distribution of responses to each question from Round 1, as well as a 
reminder of their own scores from the earlier round.  We presented quantitative ratings using 
histograms and provided the lists summarizing the free-text explanations given for high and low 
ratings.  We then asked participants to reconsider each question in light of the ratings and 
comments of their peers, and then again to provide ratings for each.  As with the first round, we 
provided space for participants to explain their ratings.  Because of the limited formatting 
capabilities available in REDCap Survey, we conducted Round 2 by emailing questionnaires to 
participants as Microsoft Word documents.  Participants returned their completed surveys via 
email or regular mail. 
 
3.2.2.4  Final Teleconference 
We drafted a report summarizing the results of the second round survey, including 
preliminary analyses of the study’s implications for institutional policies governing faculty-
industry consulting relationships.  This report was circulated to all participants.  We then 90	
	
convened a 90-minute panel meeting with all respondents via teleconference.  During this 
meeting, respondents were asked questions about their reactions to the report. They were also 
asked to suggest recommendations about oversight strategies, and to provide recommendations 
as to how the study results might inform policies regarding management of consulting activities.  
One investigator took detailed notes during the call, which were used to develop the 
recommendations presented at the conclusion of this paper. 
 
3.3  RESULTS 
  Of 13 persons invited, 12 agreed to participate and 11 completed all aspects of the study.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of the expert panelists.  Although most had at least one 
graduate degree, educational backgrounds varied considerably.  Almost half of participants 
(45%) were lawyers.  The majority of participants were from the Northeast (55%), but each of 
the four census regions was represented by at least one participant.  Eight of the 11 schools were 
private medical schools, while the remaining three were public institutions. 
  The participants’ job titles were diverse, reflecting the heterogeneity of administrative 
and organizational structures across U.S. medical schools.  Typical titles included senior roles 
within offices of research compliance, technology transfer, industry relations, conflicts of 
interest, and general counsel. 
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TABLE 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of the Expert Panel (N=11) 
 
Participant Characteristic   # 
Gender  
    Female  6 
    Male  5 
Educational Training   
    JD  5 
    Medicine  1 
    PhD  1 
    Other  4 
Years of Experience
†  
    1-5 years  0 
    6-10 years  7 
    11+ years  4 
Institution Type   
    Private  8 
    Public  3 
Census Region   
    Northeast  6 
    Midwest  3 
    South  1 
    West  1 
†Years of experience was defined as number of years overseeing faculty research and outside 
activities. 
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3.3.1  Need for Oversight of Restrictive Provisions within Consulting Agreements  
  The panel rated the importance of oversight and permissibility of 14 restrictive provisions 
that may be found in faculty consulting agreements (Table 3.2).  We grouped the provisions into 
4 broad categories: provisions related to publication and dissemination, provisions related to 
intellectual property, provisions related to confidentiality, and other.  The other provisions 
addressed a range of issues, including future research-related activities, liability, and scope of 
work.   
  The panel reached agreement (based on the prespecified threshold for “agreement” 
described above) that 6 provisions should generally be prohibited: restrictions on publication or 
dissemination that do not specifically reference the scope of consulting services, provisions that 
grant the industry partner ownership of the work of the faculty member’s collaborators or 
trainees, provisions that grant ownership rights to products that “relate to” materials or 
information obtained in the consulting relationship, provisions that require signed confidentiality 
agreements from students or trainees, restrictions on future research-related activities, and 
“supremacy clauses” asserting that the faculty member’s legal obligations to the company trump 
his/her obligations to the university or affiliated hospital employer.   
  For an additional 6 provisions, panelists agreed that oversight is important, but did not 
necessarily agree that these provisions should be prohibited.  For 2 of these provisions—a 
statement granting company ownership of intellectual property rights generated within the scope 
of consulting services (Mean Importance=7.8), and a statement defining the scope of work so 
broadly as to potentially encompass some of the faculty member’s academic work (Mean 
Importance=8.5)—panelists agreed that such provisions “may be permissible, but only with 
institutional approval and/or modification.”   
The panel disagreed as to their permissibility of the remaining 4 provisions; a 93	
	
requirement that the faculty member disclose to the company the results of research prior to 
public dissemination; a restriction on public statements that could be detrimental to the 
company’s interests; a statement granting the company ownership of intellectual property not 
limited to that generated within the scope of consulting services; and a statement defining 
“confidential information” that may be sufficiently broad to encompass information held by the 
faculty member before the start of the consulting relationship, or acquired after the relationship 
ended.  For these provisions, the panelists’ comments reflected the perceived importance of 
review (and perhaps modification) of the relevant contract language to ensure institutional 
interests were protected, but nevertheless held that such provisions might be permissible if 
appropriately worded.  For example, panelists offered comments explaining that it may be 
permissible for a company to require a faculty member to disclose the results of scholarly 
research to the company before public dissemination.  However, such disclosure should be 
limited solely to research related to the consulting activities.  Further, it should only be permitted 
for the purposes of protecting pre-determined proprietary or confidential information, and not to 
modify or restrict the dissemination of unfavorable results.  
  Notably, the panel agreed it was important for medical schools to have an oversight 
mechanism for all but 2 of the provisions, suggesting broad agreement regarding the need for 
review to protect the interests of medical schools and their broader institutions (Mean 
Importance: 7.8-9).  Several panelists expressed concern with any publication restrictions in 
consulting contracts, finding them to be contrary to the “heart of the academic mission,” while 
others held that restrictions might be permissible if there was no overlap between the consulting 
activities and a faculty member’s academic work.  Notably, several participants who viewed 
such a provision as permissible explained this belief in reference to a broader commitment that 94	
	
faculty members should not engage in research as consultants.  From this perspective, 
publication restrictions would be less problematic, as consulting activities would be unlikely to 
generate generalizable findings of potential public importance.   
  Finally, panelists judged oversight of a statement pertaining to the faculty member’s 
acceptance of legal liability as least important (mean=5.1).  The panel was divided as to the 
importance of review for this provision (range: 1-9), and was similarly divided as to its 
permissibility.  While most experts recognized the potential risks to the faculty member from 
accepting such a provision, a majority of the panel nevertheless rated this as “permissible,” 
noting that it did not affect university interests and therefore should be left to the discretion of 
the individual faculty member.   
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TABLE 3.2: Evaluation of the Importance of Oversight for & Permissibility of Restrictive 
Provisions 
Provision 
Type 
Provision  Importance 
of Oversight
† 
      (Mean) 
Permissibility
‡ 
Prohibit 
 
May be 
permiss-
ible 
Permit 
Publication and 
dissemination 
A statement restricting the faculty member’s ability 
    to publish or disseminate information that does  
    not specifically reference the scope of his/her 
    consulting services 
9.0* 10 1 0 
 
 
A statement requiring the faculty member to disclose
    the results of scholarly research to the company 
    before public dissemination 
8.8*  6  5  0 
  A statement restricting the faculty member’s ability 
    to make public statements that may be detrimental
    to the company’s interests 
7.9* 5 5 1 
 
 
A statement restricting the faculty member’s ability  
    to publish or disseminate information generated  
    within the scope of his/her consulting services 
6.7  2  7  2 
Intellectual 
Property 
A statement granting the company ownership  
    rights to the work of the faculty member’s  
    academic collaborators, students, or trainees 
9.0* 11 0 0 
  A statement granting the company ownership of  
    work products and inventions not limited to those 
    generated within the scope of the consulting 
    services 
9.0*  8  3  0 
  A statement granting the company ownership of 
   work products and inventions generated in the  
   the future that “relate to” materials or information 
   obtained in the consulting relationship 
8.8* 4 7 0 
  A statement granting the company ownership of  
   work products & inventions generated by the  
   the faculty member within the scope of consulting 
   services 
7.8*  0  11  0 
Confidentiality  A statement requiring the faculty member to obtained
   signed confidentiality agreements from students or 
   trainees  
7.9* 11 0 0 
  A statement defining “confidential information” that 
   seems broad enough to potentially encompass  
   information that the faculty member possessed  
   before the consulting relationship started or  
   acquires after the relationship ends 
8.5*  6  5  0 
Other  A statement restricting the faculty member’s ability 
   to engage in future research-related activities  9.0* 10 1 0 
 
 
A statement that the faculty member’s legal 
   obligations to the company trump any conflicting 
   commitments to the employer 
9.0*   8  3  0 
  A statement defining the scope of work for the 
   consulting relationship that seems broad  
   enough to potentially encompass some of the 
   faculty member’s academic work 
8.5* 1  10 0 
  A statement that the faculty member accepts legal  
   liability for harms to the company that may arise 
   from his/her consulting work 
5.1  1  4  6 96	
	
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
† Question text read: “How important is it, in your view, that medical schools have an oversight 
mechanism for such a provision?” 
‡.  Question text read: (Please tell us…) “Whether such a provision should be permitted in a 
consulting agreement between a faculty member and a company”.  Options included: Should not 
be permitted under any circumstances (Prohibit); May be permissible, but only with institutional 
approval and/or modification; and “Should be permitted and requires no institutional oversight.” 
*: Indicates ratings which achieved agreement in the second round, where “agreement” was 
defined by ≤3 panelists providing ratings outside the 3-point region containing the mean (1-3; 4-
6; 7-9).   
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3.3.2  Strategies for Managing Consulting Relationships 
  The panel evaluated 6 different approaches to management of consulting relationships 
within medical schools (Table 3.3).  Each provision was rated independently, and the answers 
are therefore not mutually exclusive.  
  Providing educational resources to faculty received the highest mean rating for overall 
advisability for avoiding problems with faculty members’ consulting agreements with industry.  
Participants’ comments emphasized education and training about consulting policies, with the 
goals of correcting commonly held misconceptions, enhancing understanding of the reasoning 
behind policies, and promoting faculty “buy-in” regarding the importance of university oversight 
of consulting activities.   
  Although education was universally viewed as necessary, panelists’ comments during the 
teleconference indicated that most believed education alone was insufficient to ensure adequate 
protection of universities’ interests.  Reflecting their unanimous agreement that it was 
unacceptable for a consulting agreement to prohibit disclosure of the terms of the agreement to 
the faculty member’s medical school, most participants supported policies that would bring 
consulting agreements under institutional review.  Next to educating faculty, requiring 
institutional review of all consulting agreements to ensure compliance with institutional policies 
was the highest rated management strategy (mean rating: 7.5).  Nine experts rated mandatory 
review as “advisable,” commenting that this approach offered the strongest protection for 
institutional interests, such as protection of intellectual property rights, academic freedom, 
protection of trainees and collaborators, and continued access to diverse funding opportunities.  
However, mandatory review was perceived as likely to face moderate logistical barriers (mean 
logistical feasibility: 4.4) and moderate resistance from faculty members (mean faculty support: 
4.9), leading even some panelists who favored this approach to stop short of recommending 98	
	
mandatory review for all schools.    
  Optional review was perceived as facing lower barriers than mandatory review, yet it 
received a lower score for overall advisability (mean: 5.9), reflecting a belief by several 
respondents that it offers less robust protections than mandatory review, since it would allow 
faculty with potentially concerning agreements to opt out of review.  However, participants 
noted that in circumstances where mandatory review is not feasible, optional review may provide 
some protection of institutional interests.   
  Questions asked during the teleconference yielded insights regarding the anticipated time 
required for review and strategies to reduce the associated administrative burden.  In those 
institutions currently conducting review on a mandatory or optional basis, experts reported that 
an average of 2-4 hours of staff time per agreement was required. Time for review reportedly 
varied based on the nature of the agreement, including the length of expected commitment, the 
activities involved, and whether any intellectual property might be generated by the 
relationships.  In most cases, institutions reported being able to review agreements within one 
week, although agreements that raised questions related to intellectual property often required 
more time.  Schools varied considerably in the number of agreements they reported reviewing 
each year, ranging from a low of 50 to a high of 1000 per year. 
  There was considerable heterogeneity in participants’ ratings of approaches to managing 
consulting agreements that do not involve institutional review.  For example, participants 
disagreed as to the advisability of requiring faculty to ensure that a specified set of standard 
provisions is included in their contracts.  This approach could take the form of a required 
addendum to all consulting agreements, including clauses that reinforce that the faculty 
member’s primary employment responsibility is to his/her medical school, that the faculty 99	
	
member agrees not to use institutional resources during consulting activities, and that consulting 
activities may not interfere with current or future research activities undertaken by the faculty 
member in his/her capacity as an employee of the medical school.  While 7 panelists supported 
this approach, 4 advised against it or were neutral (mean overall advisability: 6.1).  Those in 
favor characterized standard provisions as protecting the main interests of the institution at 
modest cost, while those opposed raised concerns that it would provide incomplete protection of 
university interests or impede the flexibility to reflect the specifics of each arrangement. 
  The panel was also divided regarding the advisability of providing faculty members with 
assistance in negotiating terms of consulting agreements, with 5 experts advising against the 
mechanism, 4 advising for, and 2 giving a neutral rating (mean overall advisability: 4.5).  While 
some participants believed that this process could help ensure compliance with university 
policies and alert faculty members to potential pitfalls, others were wary that negotiating terms 
risked creating a conflict of interest, as the interests of the faculty member and those of the 
university may diverge.  Based on panelists’ comments, concern seemed to be particularly salient 
among attorneys, who perceived that they could not represent a faculty member because the 
university was their client. 
  Finally, the panel rejected the strategy of making the school a party to the consulting 
agreement (mean overall advisability: 1.8), based upon a range of concerns, including that such a 
policy might require tremendous investment of institutional resources, inappropriately imply 
permission to use institutional resources, and involve the school in for-profit activities that are 
external to the academic mission and that might jeopardize the institution’s tax-exempt status.  
Panelists were also concerned about liability issues associated with this approach, citing that 
schools would risk assuming responsibility and liability for consulting activities, yet still be 100	
	
unable to control the risk associated with the actions of faculty members engaged in consulting 
activities. 
  Overall, these ratings suggest that education is a necessary but not sufficient component 
for the management of consulting agreements.  While no additional policy received universal 
endorsement, there was strong support for policies to mandate review of all agreements. 
 
TABLE 3.3: Evaluation of Approaches for Managing Consulting Relationships (Round 2) 
 
  Overall Advisability  Considerations 
Approach  Mean
  Range 
Logistical 
Feasibility
† 
Mean
 
(Range) 
 
Faculty 
Support
‡ 
Mean
 
(Range) 
 
Provide educational 
resources 
8.6* 
 
8-9 7.5 
(7-9) 
8.1 
(5-9) 
Require review and 
approval of consulting 
agreements 
7.5* 
 
3-9 4.4 
(3-9) 
4.9 
(2-9) 
Require defined set of 
standard provisions 
6.1 2-8  5.5 
(2-8) 
4.9 
(7-9) 
Provide review of 
consulting agreements on 
optional basis 
5.9 
 
1-9 6.4 
(4-9) 
6.9 
(5-9) 
Provide faculty members 
help in negotiating terms 
of consulting agreements 
4.5 
 
1-9 4.2 
(1-9) 
6.5 
(3-9) 
Include school as party to 
the agreement 
1.8* 
 
1-5 2.9 
(1-5) 
3.7 
(1-9) 
†. Logistical feasibility was rated on a 9-point scale.  A rating of 1 indicated prohibitive logistical 
barriers would exist. A 9 rating indicated no barriers would exist.  A 5 indicated moderate 
logistical barriers. 
‡. Faculty support was rated on a 9-point scale.  A rating of 1 indicated faculty opposition would 
definitely prevent implementation.  A rating of 9 indicated faculty support would definitely 
promote implementation.  A rating of 5 was ambivalent, indicated faculty would neither promote 
nor prevent implementation. 
*: Indicates ratings which achieved agreement in the second round, where “agreement” was 
defined by ≤3 panelists providing ratings outside the 3-point region containing the mean (1-3; 4-
6; 7-9).   
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3.3.3  Prohibiting Consulting by Industry Type 
  The expert panel did not recommend that universities categorically prohibit consulting 
relationships with specific industries.  Of the 10 industries examined, none were rated by a 
majority of the panel as industries for which consulting relationships should ordinarily be 
prohibited (Table 3.4).  Tobacco was the industry reported as most problematic, with 3 of 11 
experts suggesting that prohibition is appropriate.   Fewer recommended that relationships with 
manufacturers of alcohol (2 respondents), and firearms (1 respondent) be prohibited.  
Additionally, although no participants reported that relationships with insurance and financial 
service companies should be prohibited, several participants recommended that faculty members 
be cautioned regarding the risks associated with these relationships.  No participants 
recommended prohibiting consulting relationships between faculty members and the soft drink, 
fast food, insurance, financial services, pharmaceutical, medical device, or biotechnology 
industries.  
  Participants’ qualitative comments illuminate why they did not advocate banning 
consulting relationships with specific industries.  Participants emphasized the beneficial aspects 
of consulting relationships in enhancing both scholarship and research.  While participants 
recognized the potential risks associated with some relationships, they expressed a preference for 
assessing each potential relationship based upon the specifics of the arrangement, rather than 
relying on broad judgments based upon the industry type.  In addition, some participants 
expressed reluctance to interfere with the outside activities of faculty members by proscribing 
entire classes of industry relationships.   
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TABLE 3.4: Considering Prohibition of Consulting by Industry Type (Round 2) 
 
Industry Type  Should Schools Prohibit Consulting?
* 
(Yes)  
Tobacco 3 
Alcohol 2 
Firearms 1 
Soft Drinks  0 
Fast Food  0 
Insurance 0 
Financial Services  0 
Pharmaceuticals 0 
Medical Devices  0 
Biotechnology 0 
*Question text read: “Should consulting relationships between medical school faculty members 
and companies within any of the following industries ordinarily be prohibited? Yes/No” 
 
 
3.4  DISCUSSION 
  To our knowledge, this study is the first to describe administrators’ opinion on how 
medical schools should manage contractual and other non-financial aspects of consulting 
relationships between faculty and industry.  Through the Delphi process, we characterize shared 
norms regarding the acceptability of contract provisions, best practices for management of 
consulting relationships, and the permissibility of faculty relationships with specific industries.   
Providing education and training for faculty members on consulting activities was viewed 
as necessary but not sufficient for effective management of consulting relationships.  
Respondents supported a review mechanism for the evaluation of individual contracts, although 
the panel was divided as to both the feasibility and desirability of mandatory as opposed to 
optional review.  Additionally, respondents opposed the use of categorical prohibitions on 
consulting relationships with specific industries, recommending instead that agreements be 
evaluated based upon the specific activities of the relationship rather than upon the type of 
industry.  While consensus was not reached in all areas, this process nevertheless served to 103	
	
characterize the strengths and limitations of various approaches to institutional oversight as well 
as the reasons that may influence the permissibility of specific contract terms. 
 
3.4.1  Implications for Policy and Practice 
  Based on the results of this Delphi panel exercise, we offer the following 
recommendations for medical schools regarding the management of faculty-industry consulting 
relationships. 
 
3.4.1.1  Educational Training on Consulting Relationships 
  Our findings strongly suggest a need for medical schools to provide training and 
educational resources for faculty regarding consulting activities.  Relevant educational 
components include institutional policies and procedures governing consulting relationships, 
acceptable and problematic terms within consulting agreements, university and faculty interests 
that may be at risk, and the potential value of obtaining one’s own lawyer to review consulting 
agreements. Education can serve as a vital component in managing consulting relationships, 
raising awareness regarding the challenges posed by certain forms of relationships and offering 
an opportunity to correct misconceptions regarding consulting policies. 
  Education of faculty members about consulting relationships should be offered in a range 
of formats to maximize its reach.  The expert panel recommended seminar-style trainings, 
including new faculty orientation sessions and department-level seminars, as well as one-on-one 
meetings between potential faculty consultants and school administrators and/or attorneys skilled 
in the management of external activities.  Institutions should also make various web-based 
resources easily available to faculty members, including the complete text of all related policies, 104	
	
sample or template language, contact information for questions related to compliance with 
institutional policies, and contact information for private attorneys experienced in reviewing 
faculty consulting agreements.   
  When implementing these educational strategies, schools should work to secure buy-in 
from faculty and department chairs regarding the importance of careful review of consulting 
agreements and the reasons the university is getting involved in this area.  Particularly where 
institutional review of consulting agreements is not mandatory, ensuring faculty members’ 
compliance with institutional policies and their cooperation in pursuing the university’s goals 
will be difficult if faculty do not perceive the institution’s involvement as legitimate.  Peer-to-
peer education (for example, messaging from department chairs) may serve an important role in 
securing this buy-in, helping to build shared norms around appropriate conduct.  
 
3.4.1.2  Institutional Oversight of Consulting Activities 
  According to the expert panel, medical schools should have the right to review the terms 
of consulting agreements made between faculty members and industry.  Done well, institutional 
review by trained specialists (including attorneys or others skilled in the review of such 
agreements) offers the potential for securing the highest level of protection of institutional 
interests and academic freedoms, including ownership rights to intellectual property, 
preservation of the right to pursue research and subsequent publication and dissemination, and 
protection of trainees and collaborators whose interests could be compromised by faculty 
members’ consulting agreements.   
  While optional policies may secure at least partial protection, several panelists expressed 
concern that a voluntary approach may fail to capture those agreements most in need of review 105	
	
and those faculty members most naïve to the potential pitfalls of consulting relationships. 
Institutions should weigh the relative advantages of mandatory versus optional review in light of 
the level of difficulty they are likely to encounter implementing a mandatory approach, in terms 
of both the administrative resources required for review and potential faculty resistance to a 
strong assertion of oversight of these “private” arrangements.   
  In the face of such controversy, how might schools proceed?  The recent national trend of 
tightening financial conflict of interest policies within academic medical centers may prove 
illustrative.
174  In response to the AAMC’s 2008 release of new recommendations on conflicts of 
interest, numerous medical centers and health care delivery organizations established stricter 
conflict-of-interest policies that limited, among other interactions, the provision of gifts and 
meals by pharmaceutical companies.  While the initial reaction within many schools was heated, 
reports suggest that the new policies quickly lost their controversial character.
175  A similar 
pattern may hold when establishing new oversight policies for consulting agreements.  In 
describing the experience implementing a mandatory policy, one panelist reported faculty have 
come to appreciate the review process as valuable, identifying contract language faculty 
members themselves had not understood.  However, it remains possible that at least some faculty 
members would perceive mandatory review as an imposition and therefore strongly resist this 
approach.  Such resistance could undermine the oversight structure, particularly in cases where 
self-reporting by faculty is required to notify schools of outside relationships. 
  For schools considering instituting a review policy, the panelists offered several strategies 
to assist in the review process.  Checklists and guidelines concerning common provisions, such 
as what should or should not constitute “confidential information,” can facilitate review.  
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schools may consider the use of intellectual property waivers, through which the medical school 
can agree to waive its claim to intellectual property rights pertaining to the specific consulting 
activities.  As intellectual property is often the most contentious area of negotiation, the use of 
such waivers—where appropriate—may streamline the agreement process.   
  Finally, institutions should be explicit about the purpose of review, including whether the 
review will be conducted solely for the purpose of protecting institutional interests or will also 
consider the interests of the faculty member.  This may help the faculty member judge whether 
retaining outside counsel to safeguard his or her own interests is advisable. In some cases, 
institutions may determine that a university employee cannot review on behalf of both the faculty 
member and the university without creating a conflict of interest.  According to the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a conflict of interest may exist for an 
attorney-reviewer if (1) representation of one party (e.g., the university) would be directly 
adverse to another client (e.g., the faculty member), or if there is a significant risk that the 
representation of one client would be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to the 
other.
176  When such conflicts are present (e.g., because the reviewer is an attorney or 
institutional policy declares that a conflict exists in a broader set of circumstances), institutions 
should take care to clarify the purpose of review to the faculty member, emphasizing in 
particular that the review is to protect institutional interests and that the faculty member should 
consider retaining private counsel to protect his/her own interests.  
  Some medical schools may not find it feasible to implement mandatory review policies in 
the near future.  In such cases, schools should consider alternative mechanisms to protect 
institutional interests—such as optional review, standard contract addenda, or audits of randomly 
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their outside financial relationships—to support compliance with institutional policies on 
consulting activities. 
 
3.4.1.3  Contract Language 
  Panelists’ ratings and comments suggest a number of recommendations regarding the 
management and permissibility of various restrictive provisions within consulting agreements.  
These recommendations, which are summarized in Table 3.5, fall into three broad categories: 
general recommendations, intellectual property considerations, and considerations relating to 
publication and dissemination. 
  With respect to general recommendations on contract language, the panelists’ ratings 
suggest that so-called “supremacy clauses,” which specify that the faculty member’s legal 
obligations to the company trump any conflicting commitments to his/her medical school 
employer, should be prohibited.   Such statements conflict with the primary and pre-existing 
commitments of faculty members to their universities.  However, as one participant observed, 
these provisions may be permissible “under a very limited number of circumstances,” such as in 
the rare cases where the medical school has reviewed the agreement and subsequently 
determined that the terms do not conflict with the obligations of the faculty member as an 
employee of the medical school.   
  The panelists’ ratings and associated comments also suggest that consulting agreements 
should not include “noncompete clauses” that create limits on the faculty member’s ability to 
engage in future research-related activities, such as obtaining grants or research contracts, in a 
certain area.  As described by one panelist, such a provision “begins to impact the faculty 
member’s terms of employment within the institution (medical school) and should not be 108	
	
permitted.”  Finally, to effectuate institutional review, panelists made clear that consulting 
agreements must not be permitted to contain a provision making the contract itself confidential. 
  With respect to intellectual property provisions, we identified 3 recommendations from 
the ratings and comments of the panelists.  These recommendations reflect a general concern that 
poorly managed consulting agreements could enable a company to “reach in” to a faculty 
member’s academic work or that of his/her collaborators or trainees.  First, contract language 
granting intellectual property rights for work products and inventions made by the faculty 
member should be assigned to the company only for those inventions made as a sole and direct 
result of providing the consulting services.  Second, consulting agreements should specify that 
any assignment of intellectual property to the company is subject to any prior or superior rights 
of the academic institution.  Third, consulting agreements should not grant a company ownership 
of work products produced by the consulting faculty member’s collaborators, students, or 
trainees. 
  Finally, we identified 4 recommendations related to contract language associated with 
publication and dissemination rights.  These recommendations reflect an underlying commitment 
to research and dissemination as an integral component of the academic mission.  First, 
consulting agreements should not restrict the ability of the faculty member to publish or 
otherwise disseminate information outside the scope of consulting services, particularly 
information or research results related to the faculty member’s academic work.  Second, 
recognizing that a company may have a legitimate interest in protecting confidential commercial 
information, some restrictions on a faculty member’s ability to publish or otherwise disseminate 
information associated with consulting activities may be permissible.  However, such restrictions 
should be limited to the protection of confidential proprietary information obtained as a direct 109	
	
result of the consulting activity.   
  Third, consulting agreements should not restrict a faculty member’s freedom to make 
public statements that may be detrimental to the company’s interests. Two panelists felt that 
companies might have a legitimate interest in ensuring that faculty consultants did not make 
disparaging remarks about the company or its products, and that this interest could be balanced 
against the university’s interest in free discourse—for example, by ensuring that contracts at least 
enable faculty to speak freely on matters of public interest such as unfavorable research results.  
However, in general, panelists’ comments conveyed heavy skepticism toward any restriction on 
public statements. 
Fourth, given the potential challenges in distinguishing information generated through 
consulting from information gleaned outside consulting relationships, agreements should include 
a clear, narrow definition or other mechanism for the identification of what constitutes 
“confidential information”.  For instance, medical schools, using checklists, could ensure that 
agreements contain a standard definition of confidential information, or that a company’s 
proffered definition does not reach the consultant’s academic work.  An example of categories 
that should be excluded from information protected as confidential might include the following:  
(a) information that the faculty member possessed before receipt from the company;  
(b) information that is or becomes a matter of public knowledge through no action by the 
faculty member; 
(c) information that the faculty member rightfully receives from a third party not owing a 
duty of confidentiality to the company;  
(d) information that is disclosed without a duty of confidentiality to a third party by, or with 
the authorization of, the company; and 
(e) information that is independently developed by the faculty member and falls outside the 
work for hire in the consulting relationship. 
 
3.4.1.4  The Role of Students and Trainees in Consulting Activities 
  Although we did not specifically inquire about whether it was ethically acceptable for 110	
	
faculty members to include students and trainees in their consulting activities, several panelists 
offered comments flagging this as an important issue for institutional oversight.  Some might 
argue that opportunities to participate in faculty members’ consultancies could greatly enrich a 
student’s educational experience—for instance, by providing a window into how biomedical 
discoveries travel from bench to bedside.  However, in comments offered in response to related 
questions on the Delphi survey, most participants stated that student and trainee participation in 
faculty consulting should be prohibited, as it would constitute an inappropriate use of university 
resources and might exploit students and jeopardize their academic progress.  However, in 
clarifying comments offered during the teleconference, these panelists seemed open to students 
and trainees independently participating in consulting activities.  Such students should execute 
their own consulting agreements with the company, with institutional oversight.  Additional 
measures may be necessary to manage potential conflicts in cases where a student and faculty 
member are both engaged in consulting relationships with the same company, such as ensuring 
that the faculty member does not have a supervisory role over the student in both academic and 
non-academic contexts. 
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TABLE 3.5: Recommendations for Consulting Agreement Oversight and Guidance on 
Contract Language 
Recommendation Type   
General Recommendations    The faculty member’s primary obligation is to the 
university; consulting agreements may not include 
“supremacy clauses” or other language granting the 
company superior rights.  
    Consulting agreements may not include “noncompete 
clauses” that place limits on the faculty member’s ability 
to engage in future research-related activities in the field 
related to the consulting activities. 
  Consulting agreements may not include language making 
the terms of the agreement nondisclosable to the faculty 
member’s academic institution and academic 
collaborators. 
Intellectual Property    Work products and inventions made by the faculty 
member should be assigned to the company only where 
the work product or invention was made solely and 
directly because of the consulting activities. 
    Any assignment of intellectual property rights to the 
company is subject to any prior or superior rights of the 
academic institution.  
    Consulting agreements may not grant a company 
ownership of work products or inventions made wholly or 
in part by the consulting faculty member’s academic 
collaborators, students, or trainees. 
Publication & 
Dissemination 
  Restrictions on a faculty member’s ability to publish or 
disseminate “confidential” and “proprietary” commercial 
information may be permissible, but consulting 
agreements may not restrict a faculty member’s ability to 
publish or otherwise disseminate information that is 
outside the scope of consulting services, particularly 
research results, data, and other information arising from 
the faculty member’s academic work. 
    Consulting agreements should not restrict a faculty 
member’s ability to make public statements that may be 
detrimental to the company’s business interests. 
    Consulting agreements should include a clear definition or 
other mechanism for determining what does and does not 
constitute “confidential information”. The definition must 
not be so broad as to potentially encompass information 
obtained outside of the consulting relationship. 112	
	
 
3.4.2  Limitations 
  This study did not examine the full range of provisions that may be included in 
consulting agreements, nor did we exhaust the possible oversight approaches for management of 
consulting relationships.  While our question domains did reflect the findings of our earlier 
interview study, it is possible we excluded other important considerations, such as the use of 
retrospective audits to monitor compliance with school-level policies in the absence of a 
structure for prior review.  
  Additionally, like all Delphi studies, our outcome is dependent upon the composition of 
the expert panel.  Our study design aimed to minimize the effect of panel composition through 
several mechanisms, including the use of detailed recruitment criteria to ensure selection of 
participants based upon subject matter expertise.  If important perspectives were nevertheless 
overlooked in the recruitment process, then the results of the process may not be representative 
of the universe of administrators.   
  Three aspects of the panel composition are worth noting.  First, lawyers comprised the 
largest educational category of our panelists.  While this may reflect a general trend within 
medical schools, it nevertheless suggests that our panel may have approached the topic with a 
risk-management perspective, which may not reflect the full range of considerations relevant to 
the evaluation of faculty-industry consulting relationships.  Second, it is also possible that our 
selection criteria, by emphasizing schools that had either implemented or considered a 
mechanism for the review of faculty consulting agreements, may have favored the inclusion of 
panelists who supported a more active, interventionist approach.  Third, while public institutions 
account for approximately 60% of U.S. medical schools, they comprised only 30% of our panel.  113	
	
To the extent that public and private institutions differ with respect to their governance structures 
or administrative or legal environments, our results may not fully reflect the experiences of 
public institutions.  
  A more fundamental issue for the Delphi method concerns the appropriateness of the 
method to addressing governance questions.  First, unlike technological forecasting or even 
clinical appropriateness, for which there are defined standards by which we can assess its 
accuracy, it is often more difficult to identify a single, independent criterion by which to assess 
the results of a Delphi study involving questions of governance, or even to identify the 
dimension we aim to improve.  Whereas clinical appropriateness assessments aim to improve 
health outcomes, it is less clear what independent standard might be used to assess the results of 
a Delphi study examining best practices for the management of consulting relationships.  There 
may be criteria by which to measure some aspects of these relationships, such as the success of 
various policy approaches for risk-management considerations, including limiting the number of 
legal challenges over intellectual property rights.   However, it is less clear what standard would 
exist for assessing other relevant considerations, such as the appropriate level of faculty 
autonomy, or whether a medical school has an obligation to protect the interests of its faculty 
members in their external relationships.   
  Finally, we acknowledge the likelihood that the policies that our experts recommend 
likely reflect their own current and prior experiences with managing consulting relationships 
within their respective institutions. Our aim was not to provide a representative view of all 
attitudes, but rather to elicit a realistic discussion of the policy alternatives available for the 
management of faculty-industry consulting relationships and the likely obstacles facing various 
strategies to address them among individuals who had devoted substantial thought to these 114	
	
issues.  
3.5  CONCLUSION 
  The issue of contractual and other non-financial conflicts raised by faculty consulting 
relationships has sat is the shadow of the attention given to financial conflicts of interest, but 
merits consideration and action.  While consulting relationships offer many benefits, they may 
also compromise the interests of medical schools as well as those of faculty members 
themselves.  Despite growing awareness of the potential risks associated with these relationships, 
there remains considerable variation across schools in the management of faculty-industry 
consulting activities, suggesting a need for consensus-building activities.   
  This study is the first to identify areas of agreement across experts as to the management 
of consulting relationships, including identification of those provisions that should not be 
permitted within consulting agreements.  In addition, our study offers recommendations for how 
agreements should be worded to protect institutional interests, and characterizes the strengths 
and limitations of different oversight mechanisms.  Our findings suggest that medical schools 
should develop a variety of educational resources, both to raise awareness of concerns associated 
with faculty consulting and to support faculty members’ compliance with school policies on 
consulting.  In addition to education, medical schools should also consider mandatory review of 
consulting agreements to ensure compliance with school policies.  The strategies we identify can 
allow medical schools to facilitate consulting relationships and their potential benefits for 
individual and population-level health, while minimizing the risks that such relationships pose to 
the academic and clinical missions of the institutions. 
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